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FRASER ECONOMIC COMMENTARY 
The Fraser of Allander Economic Commentary was first 
published in 1975.  The new association between 
PricewaterhouseCoopers and the University of 
Strathclyde’s Business School provides the Fraser of 
Allander Institute with the support to continue the 
Commentary, and we gratefully acknowledge this support.  
The Fraser of Allander Institute is a research unit within the 
Department of Economics at the University of Strathclyde 
in Glasgow.  The Institute carries out research on the 
Scottish economy, including the analysis of short-term 
movements in economic activity.  Its researchers have an 
international reputation in modelling regional economies 
and in regional development.  One-off research projects 
can be commissioned by private and public sector clients.  
If you would like further information on the Institute’s 
research or services, please contact the Institute 
Administrator on 0141 548 3958 or email the Institute at 
fraser@strath.ac.uk. 
 
The Fraser of Allander Institute was established in 1975 as 
a result of a donation from the Hugh Fraser Foundation.  
We gratefully acknowledge the contribution of the 
Buchanan and Ewing Bequest towards the publication 
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Notes to contributors 
The editors welcome contributions to the Economic 
Perspectives section. Material submitted should be of 
interest to a predominately Scottish readership and written 
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Since we last reported in October there has 
been a considerable deterioration in the 
actual and forecast performance of all the 
major economies. In October we considered 
there was a ‘high probability’ that Scotland 
would go into recession in 2009. Now, we 
are certain that not only is Scotland currently 
in recession but that the recession looks 
likely to be as severe as that in the 1980s 
and could even be worse. The tentacles of 
recession are spreading throughout the 
economy with construction and financial 
service activity subject to sustained 
contraction, hotels & catering turning down 
from the first quarter of last year and real 
estate & business services contracting 
appreciably after March. Economy-wide 
GVA contracted by -0.8% in the third quarter 
and seems likely to have fallen markedly in 
the fourth quarter if the UK’s performance is 
any guide. Third-quarter manufactured 
exports decreased by 1% in real terms and 
by 0.4% over the year. Business surveys 
covering the fourth quarter period reinforce 
the expectation that the slowdown will be 
severe. In the labour market employment is 
falling and unemployment is rising. 
 
We are in the midst of a deepening world 
recession driven by significant falls in 
aggregate demand, as the effect of bursting 
asset prices bubbles in property and shares 
leads households to scale back demand. 
High levels of household and corporate debt 
are also influencing the scale of the cut back 
in aggregate demand. With world demand 
generally contracting the principal exporting 
countries are likely to be disproportionately 
hit, other things equal. Conversely, those 
countries with a productive structure where 
exports count for disproportionately less e.g. 
the US, and where the public sector is 
disproportionately bigger, might be 
expected, other things equal, to do less 
badly in the recession. France offers a 
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possible example on both criteria. In these 
circumstances the impact of the recession 
on the UK and Scotland will not be the worst 
in the world as some have predicted. 
 
The banking crisis and the apparent freezing 
of the credit supply function are secondary 
to the fall in aggregate demand. However, 
one should not minimise their importance. 
Lending has clearly dropped considerably, 
in part because individual countries have 
lost the lending previously provided by 
foreign banks. In the UK this amounted to 
about 30 percent of overall lending. Lending 
by UK banks has also declined as they seek 
to rebuild their balance sheets. The drop in 
the supply of credit has clearly accelerated 
the downturn in GDP as any monetary 
buffer that might have been available to 
provide working capital to help companies 
adjust more slowly to the downturn in 
demand has been removed. It remains to be 
seen how quickly the UK government’s 
injection of capital into many of the key 
British banks, the introduction of its loan 
guarantee or insurance scheme, and the 
lower interest rates and quantitative easing 
effected by the Bank of England’s Monetary 
Policy Committee, mitigate the scale and 
duration of the recession. It is clearly the 
case that in the face of severe restrictions 
on the supply of credit any recovery in 
demand and GDP growth will be more 
difficult to engineer. 
 
The developing scale of the global downturn 
suggests that the US fiscal package is 
unlikely to compensate for the depressing 
effect on world trade of the US recession, 
although it may mitigate it, and will not be 
sufficient to substitute for inadequate 
demand stimulus policies in the surplus 
countries. As world demand contracts there 
are rising protectionist fears and a clear 
need to develop a better global governance 
of the financial system. The UK fiscal 
injection appears to be too little too late, and 
relatively small compared to the US stimulus 
package. A case can be made for a further 
fiscal stimulus, although rising public sector 
debt and foreign exchange market pressure 
on sterling may limit the government’s 
options. The significant loosening of 
monetary policy in the UK, which is 
continuing, appears to be thwarted by a 
‘liquidity trap’ as asset prices fall and 
economic agents seek to hold cash rather 
than invest or spend. The case for 
temporary bank nationalisation in the UK 
and the creation of a ‘bad bank’ for toxic 
assets appears to grow stronger as the only 
effective means of unfreezing lending. 
 
With macroeconomic policy powers 
reserved to Westminster the Scottish 
economy will benefit from the UK fiscal 
injection. Yet, while the Scottish government 
action will contribute little to aggregate 
demand it can play a constructive role in 
helping the economy adjust to the 
consequences of the recession and 
mitigating the effects on long-term growth. 
 
Against this background we have prepared 
new forecasts that significantly revise 
downwards our expectation for Scottish 
growth over the next three years. Again 
because of the heightened levels of 
uncertainty we present a range of forecasts. 
On this occasion, a central forecast, which is 
bracketed by ‘optimistic’ and ‘worst’ 
projections.  
 
On our central case we predict that GVA will 
fall by around -2.6% this year and by -1.2% 
next year. Recovery does not begin to get 
underway until 2011 and remains below 
trend in 2012. Employment is forecast to 
decline by 14,200 in 2008, by 94,200 in 
2009 and by 51,400 in 2010, a total net job 
loss of nearly 160,000 over the three years. 
Unemployment rises from 137,000 in 2008 
to a peak of around 210,000 in 2010. 
 
GDP performance in third quarter 2008 
The latest official government outturn data for the Scottish 
economy refer to the third quarter 2008. Total Scottish 
gross value added at real basic prices fell by -0.8% in the 
quarter but rose by 1.4% over the year. The deterioration 
was worse in Scotland than in the UK – see Figure 1 - with 
UK GVA contracting by -0.6% in the quarter, while output 
over the year rose by 1.9%.  
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Service sector growth was appreciably weaker in Scotland 
during the quarter with an outturn of -1.1% here compared 
to -0.5% in the UK – see Figure 2. Over the year, Scottish 
services grew by 2%, while UK services expanded by 
2.4%.  
 
Within Scottish services the sector contributing most to the 
weak performance of Scottish services during the quarter 
was real estate and business services (REBS), which 
accounts for 18% of overall Scottish GVA compared to 
23% in the UK. REBS contracted by -3.7% in the quarter 
compared to a much smaller fall of -1.2% in the UK. GVA in 
Scottish REBS has been declining from the first quarter of 
last year – see Figure 6 – while UK REBS began to 
contract only in the third quarter. It is difficult to understand 
precisely why the downturn is more severe in the Scottish 
part of the sector. Real estate and property related services 
account for a 45% share of Scottish REBS, so there may 
be a property market link to the weaker performance of 
REBS. But the difficulty with this view is that the scale of 
the downturn in the housing market is greater in the UK 
overall, although that may not be the case in commercial 
property. Pure professional & business services make up a 
13% share of REBS and they may be contracting more 
rapidly in Scotland because of banking and financial 
service linkages and the weaker performance of that sector 
in Scotland – see Figure 5. 
 
Elsewhere in services, the retail & wholesale sector 
contracted in both Scotland and the UK during the quarter, 
by -1.5% and -2.7% respectively. But the additional data 
produced by the Scottish government indicating that it was 
wholesaling and not retailing that weakened in Scotland. 
Scottish Retail GVA rose by 1.9% in the quarter and by 
3.1% over the year. Financial services while weaker in 
Scotland grew by 0.5% in the quarter compared to growth 
of 1.1% in the UK. Figure 5 suggests that Scottish financial 
services has consistently underperformed UK financial 
services since the second quarter of 2006, with the 
exception of the fourth quarter 2006 and fourth quarter 
2007. We only have Scottish data for GVA growth in 
banking and this series indicates a fall of -1.9% in the third 
quarter of 2008. Other weaker Scottish service sectors in 
the third quarter included the public sector, which grew by 
0.1% here compared to an increase of 0.5% in the UK. 
Other services contracted by -1% compared to growth of 
0.8% in the UK, while hotels & catering cut back GVA 
slightly by -0.1% compared to growth of 0.3% in the UK. 
The only service sector, apart from retail and wholesaling, 
which out performed its UK counterpart was transport & 
communication which grew slightly by 0.1% compared to a 
small fall of -0.1% in the UK. 
 
Manufacturing in Scotland contracted by -0.6% in the third 
quarter, a smaller contraction than in UK manufacturing, 
which cut back output by -1.6% - see Figure 3. Over the 
year, GVA in Scottish manufacturing rose by 1.9% whereas 
UK manufacturing output fell by -0.5%. 
 
Within manufacturing, the relatively stronger Scottish 
performance in the third quarter was essentially driven by 
chemicals, - accounting for 10% of manufacturing GVA - 
which grew by a staggering 9.5% in the quarter, while UK 
chemicals expanded by only 0.5%. Such a large change 
suggests a one-off adjustment of some description and is, 
therefore, unlikely to be sustained.  Refined petroleum 
products also turned in a very strong growth performance 
in Scotland compared to the UK, expanding by 6.8% while 
its UK counterpart contracted by -2.9%; however, the 
sector accounts for only 1.4% of Scottish manufacturing 
GVA. Most other principal manufacturing sectors displayed 
weak or negative growth in Scotland during the third 
quarter. The food industry grew by 0.3% here compared to 
0.1% in the UK. The drinks sector experienced a fall in 
GVA of -0.7% in Scotland but registered a fall of -1.5% in 
the UK. Engineering overall contracted markedly both in 
Scotland and the UK by -2.3% and -2.5% respectively. 
Within engineering, the electronics sector cut back 
considerably in Scotland with GVA falling by -4.6%, while 
its UK counterpart registered a lesser but still marked fall of 
-2.9%. In contrast, both mechanical engineering and 
transport equipment grew by 0.1% and 0.4% in Scotland 
while contracting by -1.3% and -3.1%, respectively, in the 
UK. Finally, paper, printing & publishing and other 
manufacturing cut back production appreciably with the 
former contracting by -2.1% and the latter by -4.9%. The 
comparable UK figures were -2.1% and -2.8%. 
 
Despite the relative buoyancy of the housing market in 
Scotland, the construction sector in Scotland has 
effectively been in recession for some time – see Figure 4. 
This clearly reflects a drop-off in demand for major project 
activity from both the public and commercial property 
sectors. GVA fell by -1% in Scottish construction inn the 
quarter, while UK construction activity dropped by -0.2%. 
GVA in Scottish construction has now dropped by more 
than 6% since its peak in the forth quarter of 2006. 
 
Figure 6 brings together the GVA indexes for 10 key 
sectors that are, or have been, significant for the growth of 
the Scottish economy. The figure reveals the continuing 
strength in chemicals and transport & communication 
services, the weakness in financial services, electronics, 
and deterioration in REBS and hotels & catering. 
 
Figure 7 provides a clearer picture of how the downturn is 
affecting the Scottish economy. It does so by charting the 
scale of the decline in sectoral GVA from the last peak in 
GVA in the sector. Clearly, we can’t be certain whether the 
peaks identified actually do represent a cyclical peak and 
so the analysis could change once later data become 
available. It is appears to be the case that the downturn 
started in construction from 2006q3, which by 2008q3 had 
lost -6.3% of GVA in the sector. Financial services began 
to turn down two quarters later in 2007q1 and then 
contracted more sharply, with GVA falling by -8.5% by 
2008q3. In the next quarter 2007q2 mining & quarrying 
started to turn down and by 2008q3 it had lost -2.5% of its 
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GVA. Of course, whether the downturn in mining & 
quarrying is related to wider forces promoting the recession 
in Scotland is a moot point and could well be unrelated. 
From the fourth quarter of 2007 electronics started to turn 
down suggesting perhaps that export demand for 
manufactures was starting to be affected by falling demand 
conditions across the globe. Then from the first quarter of 
last year hotels & catering and REBS registered falling 
output. The former will clearly have been affected by both 
slowing domestic demand and the effect on tourism of 
falling foreign as well as domestic demand. We discussed 
above some of the likely drivers of the downturn in REBS. 
 
Recession issues and policy responses 
 
What is driving the recession? 
There is now much agreement that the ultimate cause of 
the global slowdown lies in the large financial imbalances 
in the world economy that built up over the past decade. 
Burgeoning current account surpluses from mid to late 
1990s in China, other emerging market economies, oil 
exporting economies, Germany and Japan, led to 
significant flows of surplus savings mainly to the United 
States (70%), a little to the UK and an array of smaller 
economies such as Spain, Ireland and Iceland. These 
surplus savings served to lower long-term real and nominal 
interest rates across the world economy and fostered a 
boom in credit aided by the financial de-regulation that 
occurred in the US, UK and elsewhere in the early 1980s. 
 
The boom in credit growth facilitated higher personal 
consumption and spending on a range of perceived high 
yielding assets, with associated growth in investment 
banking activities, hedge funds and private equity funds 
across the globe. Asset price bubbles began to emerge 
especially in housing and property markets in US, UK and 
some other European countries. The bubbles burst in 
2007, as the US fed funds rate rose some 4 percentage 
points to 5.25% between 2004 and 2006, and the extent of 
credit excess began to be evident, e.g. failed repayments 
and foreclosures in US sub-prime mortgage market. 
Banking losses were initially triggered by the defaults on 
sub-prime-mortgages. But such losses were then 
magnified dramatically throughout the banking and 
financial system on a global scale due to the creation and 
rapid growth of complex financial instruments that were 
perceived to diversify risk and returns. Examples of such 
instruments include mortgage backed securities such as 
collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs), collateralized 
debt obligations (CDOs) based on all types of assets 
including mortgages, and credit derivatives, especially the 
credit default swap (CDS), a way of insuring against losses 
on a loan portfolio, CDOs of CDOs and synthetic CDOs. 
 
The complexity of these instruments meant that the losses 
generated by the deflation of house prices, commercial 
property prices, other asset prices, and associated loan re-
payment defaults, could not easily be gauged or located. 
Banks began to lose trust in one another and inter-bank 
lending rates rose. Then, to dramatise the narrative, the 
major US and world investment bank Lehman Brother was 
allowed to go into administration by the US government on 
15th September 2008. This sent a signal round the financial 
world that insolvent banks would not necessarily be bailed-
out by governments, so inter-bank lending largely ceased 
and the wholesale money markets effectively froze.  The 
consequent loss of confidence and trust in the banking and 
other parts of financial system led to a breakdown in the 
credit supply mechanism within and outside the system - 
the so-called “credit crunch”. The scale of the losses also 
meant that banks had to restructure their balance sheets 
resulting in loans being called in, overdrafts reduced, 
reduced possibilities for re-financing of corporate loans, 
and a general cut back in lending, further exacerbating the 
credit crunch. 
 
There would appear to be some uncertainty about the 
specific drivers of the current downturn and hence the 
predicted consequences for national economies. There is a 
body of opinion that sees the bursting of the housing 
market bubble in the US, the extensive defaults on ‘sub-
prime’ mortgages, the subsequent banking losses and 
insolvencies as locating the main incidence of the global 
downturn in those countries, such as the US and the UK, 
with previously highly buoyant housing markets, significant 
household borrowings and large banking and financial 
sectors. Hence, the OECD and the IMF and others have 
forecast that the UK will be one of the countries most 
affected by the downturn. 
 
We take a somewhat different view and do not necessarily 
accept that the UK and Scotland will be the worst affected 
in terms of the size of the GDP contraction, although the 
downturn will be sizable here and perhaps unprecedented. 
 
The first point to note, perhaps obviously, is that it is falling 
aggregate demand that is driving the contraction of GDP. 
Secondly, the banking crisis and the apparent freezing of 
the credit supply function are secondary to the fall in 
aggregate demand. However, one should not minimise 
their importance. Lending has clearly dropped 
considerably, in part because individual countries have lost 
the lending previously provided by foreign banks. In the UK 
this amounted to about 30 percent of overall lending. 
Lending by UK banks has also declined as they seek to 
rebuild their balance sheets. The drop in the supply of 
credit has clearly accelerated the downturn in GDP as any 
monetary buffer that might have been available to provide 
working capital to help companies adjust more slowly to the 
downturn in demand has been removed. It remains to be 
seen how quickly the UK government’s injection of capital 
into many of the key British banks, the introduction of its 
loan guarantee or insurance scheme, and the lower 
interest rates and quantitative easing effected by the Bank 
of England’s Monetary Policy Committee, mitigate the 
scale and duration of the recession. It is clearly the case 
that in the face of severe restrictions on the supply of credit 
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any recovery in demand and GDP growth will be more 
difficult to engineer. 
 
Thirdly, as Martin Wolf notes1 drawing on work by Richard 
Koo2 on the Japanese deflation in the 1990s, falling asset 
prices will have a greater impact on demand the more 
assets have been funded by debt. This is because the 
evidence from Japan suggests that as asset prices fall 
borrowers will seek to pay down their debts so increasing 
saving and reducing consumption by more than would be 
the case from a simple wealth effect of the falling asset 
price. If this analysis is correct then significant falls in asset 
prices after a major credit boom and debt inflation are likely 
to precipitate large falls in aggregate demand. Moreover, 
the UK and the US where levels of household borrowing 
are high should, other things equal, experience a 
disproportionate drop in demand compared to those 
countries where household borrowing is lower even if asset 
prices have fallen similarly. And some asset prices such as 
those for houses and commercial property are likely to fall 
further in the US and UK. Added to this, the relatively 
greater size of the banking and financial sectors in the UK 
and US and the scale of the insolvency present in such 
banks offers a further reason, both in terms of direct 
demand reduction and restricted credit supply, why the UK 
and the US might suffer a more severe downturn.  
 
So, the analysis so far might appear to suggest that the US 
and the UK are likely to experience a more deep and 
prolonged recession than other principal economies. But 
there is another issue that needs to be considered. 
 
Fourthly, the downturn in aggregate demand is clearly 
worldwide, even though the incidence might vary inter alia 
according to the extent that asset price falls and household 
and corporate debt vary across countries. The worldwide 
contraction in demand is not of course confined to demand 
for domestic goods and services. Demand for imports is 
much affected and growing protectionist tendencies, 
including attempts to encourage domestic banks to lend 
locally rather than abroad, may serve to worsen the 
deterioration in import demand.  However, import demand 
is not met evenly from the world economy. Countries such 
as Germany, Japan, China, and export ‘platforms’ such as 
Taiwan, Ireland and Singapore that serve world trade 
disproportionately through their export activity are likely to 
experience a sizable contraction in the demand for their 
goods and services. A simple numerical example should 
make the point. Suppose there are ten, equal-sized 
countries and each experience an initial drop in domestic 
demand of 5 percent. Now assume that in nine of those 
countries the drop in import demand amounts to a fifth or 1 
percent point of the drop in domestic demand and they all 
import from the tenth country, which imports nothing. GDP 
falls by 4 percent in the nine but by 14 percent in the tenth 
country. 
 
The conclusion is that with world demand generally 
contracting the principal exporting countries are likely to be 
disproportionately hit, other things equal. Conversely, those 
countries with a productive structure where exports count 
for disproportionately less e.g. the US, and where the 
public sector is disproportionately bigger, might be 
expected, other things equal, to do less badly in the 
recession. France offers a possible example on both 
criteria. 
 
The latest GDP growth figures for the fourth quarter of 
2008 appear both to offer some support for this contention 
and to underline the seriousness of the crisis. In Japan 
GDP fell by -3.3% in the quarter, in Germany GDP 
contracted by -2.1% in the quarter, in Italy the decline was -
1.8%, while in the UK the fall was -1.5% the same rate of 
contraction as euro area (EA15) and the EU27. At the 
same time the US economy contracted by 1%, and French 
GDP fell by -1.2%. Even the Chinese economy, for so 
many years a key engine of global growth, slowed to 6.8%, 
at an annualised rate, in the fourth quarter, from an 
annualised rate of 9% in the third quarter and growth of 
13% in 2007 as a whole. Chinese GDP growth over the 
year to the fourth quarter was 9%, the lowest rate since 
2001, when an annual rate of 8.3 percent was registered, 
and it was the first time China's growth fell into the single 
figures since 2003. 
 
Policy responses 
We consider successively issues for global, UK and 
Scottish policy responses to the recession. 
 
Global 
It might appear to be a truism to suggest that the global 
nature of the downturn requires a global solution. However, 
there is a danger that some countries while acknowledging 
the global nature of the recession may seek to pass 
responsibility for dealing with it to other countries and/or 
international bodies such as the IMF. Countries such as 
China, Germany, Japan that have tended to produce much 
more than their domestic demand, so running significant 
savings surpluses and current account surpluses, will find it 
easy to blame countries such as the US, UK and Spain 
where domestic demand has far outrun supply. If such 
feelings translate into a policy stance in Germany, China 
and Japan that refuses to recognise their own obligation to 
take responsibility for maintaining global aggregate 
demand by expanding their own domestic demand, then 
the world economy will in all likelihood experience a 
depression. It is, in any event, in the direct interest of these 
countries to avoid a significant contraction in world supply 
because they will bear the brunt of it as the drop in world 
trade disproportionately reduces demand for their exports3  
 
The $800 billion fiscal stimulation package that is being 
introduced by the new Obama administration in the US is a 
welcome development notwithstanding the flaws in the 
package. While this package – equivalent to about 5% of 
US GDP - may help to promote confidence in the world 
economy generally its effect on world trade flows will be 
limited. A rough calculation suggests that if the stimulus 
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package raises US aggregate demand by an equal amount 
– unlikely given that there will be some flow into savings 
and taxes - US imports will expand by around 14% of the 
GDP expansion and given the level of world exports  - 
$16.34 trillion according to the CIA World Factbook - the 
stimulus to world exports will be less than one percent. 
However, before the stimulus package was enacted the US 
Congressional Budget Office was forecasting that US GDP 
would fall by 7% over the next two years. So, the package 
is unlikely to compensate for the depressing effect on world 
trade of the US recession, although it may mitigate it, and 
will not be sufficient to substitute for inadequate demand 
stimulus policies in the surplus countries. Moreover, in the 
medium to longer-term the post-recessionary equilibrium in 
the US will require reduced fiscal and current account 
deficits, which implies that the US demand for world 
exports must fall.  
 
There is of course also the fear that surplus countries may 
be tempted to protect their market share by adopting 
increasingly protectionist measures such as subsidising 
domestic industry. This is already beginning to happen in 
deficit countries such as the US and UK e.g. the auto 
industry, in response to the initial drop in domestic demand 
due to the asset price deflation that accompanied the credit 
crunch. Financial protectionism is also on the increase as 
governments seek to encourage domestic banks to focus 
their lending on the domestic economy. Retaliation by both 
surplus and deficit countries will eventually serve to destroy 
world supply capacity in the medium to long-term even if 
there are short-term domestic supply benefits. A more 
prolonged recession and slower long-term growth is the 
likely result. 
 
Finally, looking to the longer term, the governance of the 
global financial system must change. Specifically, the 
system must be able to facilitate the channelling of surplus 
savings into investment opportunities in emerging countries 
rather than fund debt expansion in the advanced countries 
such as the US and UK. The IMF needs to become more 
responsive to the needs of emerging country borrowers 
and help provide more effective insurance against systemic 
risks than at present.4 
 
 
The United Kingdom 
In the November 2008 Pre-Budget Report (PBR) the 
government introduced a fiscal stimulus in an attempt to 
counter the recession, which amounts to a  £25 billion 
injection of demand over the two fiscal years 2009 -10 and 
2010 –11. A £12.5 billion temporary – for one year – VAT 
cut and proposals to bring forward capital spending mean, 
according to the IFS Green Budget, that government 
borrowing will rise by £9.3 billion this year and £16.3 billion 
next year. This therefore amounts to an injection of 
additional demand equivalent to roughly 0.6% of GDP this 
year and 1.1% of GDP next year. The fiscal injection 
should be viewed in the context of a developing consensus 
that GDP may contract by -3% or more this year – in 
February a consensus of new forecasts averaging -2.8% 
for 2009 - and by low or zero growth in 2010 – new 
forecast consensus in February of 0.5%.5 Against this 
background the fiscal injection looks like too little too late, 
and relatively small compared to the US stimulus package. 
It is also assumed that the injection will actually raise 
aggregate demand as hoped for by the government. It may 
not do so, of course, if households fully anticipate that they 
will have to pay higher taxes and experience lower public 
spending in order to fund the current stimulus.6 
 
We contend that there is a case for the government to go 
further and introduce a new fiscal stimulus, front ended as 
far as is feasible on the 2009-10 fiscal year. The orders of 
magnitude required are for about a further £20 billion for 
the two fiscal years 2009-10 and 2010-11, with reversal of 
the overall £45 billion injection progressively after that to 
restore the public finances. This would amount to an 
approx stimulus to aggregate demand of 3%, which would, 
therefore, be closer to the anticipated decline in GDP over 
the two years and a little closer to the relative scale of the 
US fiscal stimulus package. 
 
The deteriorating state of the UK’s public finances and the 
rising yield on 10-year government bonds – now at 3.41%, 
40 basis points above 10-year German government bonds 
– suggests that a further fiscal stimulus could be 
destabilising. Moreover, the greater the delay the greater 
the risk that the stimulus will become irrelevant while the 
risk of a loss of confidence in sterling in the foreign 
exchange markets and the threat of future inflation will 
weigh more heavily. All of these factors need to be 
weighed carefully but in our view the most pressing need is 
for further injections of aggregate demand from the public 
sector to offset the apparent continuing and perhaps 
worsening downward spiral in private sector demand 
across the global economy. 
 
Since we last reported in October 2008 the Monetary 
Policy Committee (MPC) of the Bank of England (BOE) has 
cut bank rate from 5% to 1%. There is an expectation that 
interest rates will fall further to zero. With interest rates 
close to zero and prices rises turning negative, real interest 
rates will effectively be increasing and expectations will 
generally be for nominal interest rates to rise7. The 
expectation will also be for bond prices to fall. There will be 
no incentive to hold monetary assets that are falling in 
value for speculative/investment purposes and so 
economic agents will seek to hold cash – a ‘liquidity trap’. 
In such circumstances a policy of boosting liquidity and 
interest rate cuts will fail to influence the real economy. 
There is evidence that this is happening in the UK with 
narrow measures of the money supply showing some 
growth following the efforts of the BOE to raise liquidity. But 
this does not appear to be passing through into lending and 
growth in the broader money supply. For example, non-
seasonally adjusted M4 lending – which includes private 
sector bank and building society deposits – fell by -0.1% 
and -0.3% in November and December respectively. It is in 
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this context that the BOE is expected to seek to expand the 
money supply by directly buying up public and private 
assets – so-called ‘quantitative easing – and so bypass the 
banking system. 
 
It is also in this context that calls for the government to 
temporarily nationalise the main UK banks should be 
viewed with increasing sympathy. There may also be a 
further case for the removal of the toxic assets currently 
residing in these banks and their placement in a ’bad bank’, 
where they can be priced and subsequently sold off when 
market conditions allow. The UK government has already 
done much. New capital has been brought into the main 
banks – with the exception of Barclays and HSBC – in two 
successive tranches of £37 billion and £20 billion. Loan 
guarantees representing contingent liabilities of up to £600 
billion have also been given. But there is a view 
increasingly gaining acceptance that the government 
should go further and nationalise the key banks, all be it 
temporarily. 
 
The case for temporary nationalisation rests on four 
propositions: 
 
x There is a positive externality to the wider 
economy from increased bank lending. The profit 
maximising objectives of shareholders require 
balance street restructuring and reduced lending 
risk. Banks are withdrawing loans and are 
applying tighter lending conditions to new lending. 
The existence of a non-priced externality offers a 
classic example of market failure and prima facie 
justification for government intervention. The 
government’s majority shareholding does not 
appear to be changing current bank behaviour in 
the interests of the minority private shareholders 
and so temporary nationalisation may be justified. 
 
x Despite falls in the inter-bank lending rates, there 
is still uncertainty about whether British banks are 
insolvent. This uncertainty and lack of trust will 
continue until toxic assets are taken out of the 
banks. 
 
x Relatedly, issues of capital adequacy of the banks 
seem likely to continue as long as they remain 
outside complete government ownership. 
 
x The need to focus on more traditional forms of 
lower return/less risk banking may be opposed by 
existing private shareholders. 
 
The case against nationalisation appears to offer the 
following key points: 
 
x There would be a significant further rise in public 
debt, which might encourage a loss of confidence 
in the UK’s credit rating, damage sterling and 
even the City of London’s reputation. 
x Private sector banks not taken into public 
ownership may be ‘crowded out’ by what is in 
effect a government subsidy. 
 
x A so-called ‘temporary’ nationalisation may be 
difficult to unravel. 
 
x Non-market considerations may begin to 
dominate the behaviour of the banks as politicians 
interfere to put social objectives, even short-term 
political objectives, above corporate efficiency and 
private shareholder returns. 
 
We recognise the case against but, on balance, believe 
that current circumstances give greater weight to the case 




In considering policy issues for the Scottish government it 
is useful to distinguish between: 
 
x policies to counteract the recession, and 
x policies to deal with the consequences of 
recession 
 
Counteracting the recession 
While the Scottish government has little power to influence 
aggregate demand in the short-term in the Scottish 
economy, it should be remembered that the current 
constitutional settlement reserves macro-economic 
stabilisation to Westminster. The Scottish economy should 
benefit from the £25 billion UK fiscal injection introduced in 
November’s PBR by a direct boost to demand of up to 2% 
of GDP. A significant injection. But leakages from a small 
open economy are greater than from a larger economy and 
so both the direct and indirect stimulus to demand will be 
less. 
 
The Scottish Government has introduced a six-point 
stimulus plan: bringing forward some capital expenditure 
e.g. investment in affordable housing; enhanced support 
for tourism promotion; speeding up the planning process; 
increased support for energy efficiency; increased advice 
to businesses and individuals; and improved financial 
advice to vulnerable individuals. The package will bring a 
very small stimulus to aggregate demand in 2009 and 2010 
as some expenditures are brought forward but the overall 
macro effect will negligible. Nevertheless, taken together 
with the UK government fiscal stimulus and the significant 
monetary easing introduced by the MPC the package is 
valuable. The information and advice elements of the 
package may offer some market adjustment assistance 
and some mitigation of recession effects. 
 
There are other possibilities and imperatives for the 
Scottish government in seeking to counteract the 
recession.  The Scottish construction industry was first into 
recession and as noted above has been languishing for 
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It might seem fanciful but the recession could offer 
possibilities for raising the trend rate of growth of the 
Scottish economy. We know R&D and innovation are 
critical to growth but there is also evidence that companies 
that raised their R&D spend during a recession improved 
their subsequent competitive position. A US study of a 
large sample of firms over 20 years, which included the 
1990-91 recession, found that many industry leaders at 
end of period were those increasing their R&D during 
recession.8There is clear need for the government and its 
agencies to publicise this message and examine what 
public policy in Scotland can do encourage R&D at a time 
when many firms will be under pressure to cut back on 
R&D outlays. 
some time. The government needs to consider not just how 
much public investment can be brought forward within the 
budget. The government has been criticised by opposition 
parties for the delays to public investment allegedly caused 
by the development and introduction of the Scottish 
Futures Trust to replace Public Private Partnerships 
(PPPs). But in current recessionary circumstances PPPs 
will find it difficult to proceed given the difficulties of raising 
private finance. In such conditions there may be a case for 
bringing forward conventional procurement projects and 
temporarily delaying any planned PPPs, although 
conventional procurement raises its own financing issues.  
 
Further support for the construction industry might be 
possible if the government was willing to consider making 
advance payments to contracted companies that may be 
experiencing financial constraints, such as those 
undertaking government construction work.  
 
Research also suggests that in a recession many 
unemployed workers will wish to start their own firms. The 
Enterprise Allowance scheme in the 1980s was introduced 
to help workers made redundant in the early 1980s 
recession start their own firms. This was superseded by a 
shift away from start-up support as an unemployment 
measure. But there may now be a case for policymakers in 
Scotland to examine the possibility of using existing 
business birth rate support policies to target the newly 
redundant who may be encouraged to start their own firm. 
 
Other actions to ease credit difficulties that the Scottish 
government could consider include, directly encouraging 
banks in Scotland to lend. The Scottish government will be 
a very large customer of the banks. It could seek to make 
its banking contracts conditional on a more pro-active 
stance on lending by the banks in Scotland.  It could further 
ensure that the rule of ten-day payments of invoices to 




Finally, perhaps more could be done to assist the labour 
market to more flexibly adjust to the recession by: 
encouraging the further and higher education sector to 
provide short-term but intense training courses for those 
coming on to unemployment register; and assisting 
redundant workers in starting their own firms (see below). 
Since we last reported in October there has been a 
considerable deterioration in the actual and forecast 
performance of all the major economies. In October we 
considered there was a ‘high probability’ that Scotland 
would go into recession in 2009. Now, we are certain that 
not only is Scotland currently in recession but that the 
recession looks likely to be as severe as that in the 1980s 
and could even be worse. The tentacles of recession are 
spreading throughout the economy with construction and 
financial service activity subject to sustained contraction, 
hotels & catering turning down from the first quarter of last 
year and real estate & business services contracting 
appreciably after March. Economy-wide GVA contracted by 
-0.8% in the third quarter and seems likely to have fallen 
markedly in the fourth quarter if the UK’s performance is 
any guide. Third-quarter manufactured exports decreased 
by 1% in real terms and by 0.4% over the year. Business 
surveys covering the fourth quarter period reinforce the 
expectation that the slowdown will be severe. 
 
Dealing with the consequences of recession 
The policy objective here should be to try and ensure that 
the recession does not damage the long-term trend of 
Scottish growth. Further, there is the question whether the 
recession might provide an opportunity to raise the trend in 
Scottish GDP growth? We plan to deal with the question 
what post-recession Scottish economy might look like and 
related policy issues in a later edition of the Commentary. 
We confine ourselves to a few observations here. 
 
The government should through Scottish Enterprise and 
related agencies seek to minimise the impact of the 
recession on the Scottish growth trend. Existing investment 
funds such as the Seed Fund, Co-investment Fund and 
Venture Fund should be examined to see if they can play a 
role in overcoming key firms’ cash flow and liquidity 
problems due to credit constraints associated with the 
current recession. A debate should be encouraged on how 
Scottish Development International might deal with the 
expected decline in inward investment through the 
recession e.g. Increased marketing? Increased corporate 
targeting? Greater flexibility in provision of Regional 
Selective Assistance? 
 
In the Scottish labour market net job creation is falling and 
unemployment is rising – see Labour Market Issues section 
of this Commentary. In the final three months of 2008, 
employment fell by 0.2% to 2.53 million, while 
unemployment, on the preferred ILO measure rose by 
9.2% to 137,000. The rate of increase in unemployment 
was faster than in the UK but at 5.1% of the labour force 
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Optimistic 0.65 -1.90 -0.43 1.08 1.73 
     
 
Central 0.59 -2.57 -1.21 0.52 1.14 
     
 









2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
      
Optimistic -14,200 -73,007 -42,400 7,923 25,089 
      
Central -14,200 -94,179 -51,440 3,037 14,476 
      









2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
      
Optimistic 137.2 173.3 194.5 191.0 176.3 
 5.1 6.5 7.3 7.2 6.6 
Central 137.2 184.4 209.9 207.4 199.9 
 5.1 6.9 7.9 7.8 7.5 
Worse 137.2 191.6 223.1 226.1 220.4 
 5.1 7.2 8.4 8.5 8.3 
 
 
Against this background we have prepared new forecasts 
that significantly revise downwards our expectation for 
Scottish growth over the next three years. Again because 
of the heightened levels of uncertainty we present a range 
of forecasts. On this occasion, a central forecast, which is 
bracketed by ‘optimistic’ and ‘worst’ projections. These 
forecasts and the underlying scenarios are discussed in 




On our central case we predict that GVA will fall by around 
-2.6% this year and by -1.2% next year – see Table 1. 
Recovery does not begin to get underway until 2011 and 
remains below trend in 2012. On the worst case the global 
recession and financial sclerosis continues well in to 2011 
and while there may be some recovery in the latter part of 
2011 growth remains weak and significantly below trend in 
2012. Only in the optimistic case does recession effectively  
end next year but with a weak then strengthening recovery 
in 2011 and 2012. 
 
In our central case projection, we now take the position that 
Scottish economy will perform a little stronger than 
expected UK growth. We take this view because the 
impacts of the systemic drop in global aggregate demand 
resulting from falling asset prices and financial sclerosis will 
be sufficient to outweigh specific sectoral outcomes such 
as the contraction of financial service and banking 
activities. Experience shows that the Scottish economy is 
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more robust than the UK to a sharp contraction in 
aggregate demand as we noted in the previous 
Commentary. In the circumstance of the causes of the 
present recession the factors of relevance include: the 
somewhat bigger public sector and higher degree of social 
security payments in Scotland, while lower asset ownership 
e.g. houses and shares, means less exposure to asset 
price bubbles and bursts. On the other hand, Scotland’s 
relatively higher export propensity may make Scotland a 
little more vulnerable to a drop in global demand. But 
overall, we now consider that the circumstances of the 
recession make it more likely than we previously thought 
that the Scottish economy will hold up relatively better than 




Table 2 outlines our net job change projections on the 
three cases. In the central forecast employment is forecast 
to decline by 14,200 in 2008, by 94,200 in 2009 and by 
51,400 in 2010, a total net job loss of nearly 160,000 over 
the three years. This is bracketed by an anticipated net job 
loss of nearly 130,000 in the optimistic case and by 
186,000 in the worst case. To the worst case must be 
added a further 6,600 net job loss as the contraction in the 
labour market runs into 2011. 
 
It is worth pointing out, as the Labour Market Issues 
section of this Commentary indicates, that it remains 
unclear how the more flexible and deregulated labour 
market that has emerged over the past 25 years will impact 
on the level of jobs and the level of unemployment during 
the current recession. We note that there are strong signs 
that the downturn may affect more adversely those 
employed on more flexible employment terms, with 
companies and co-operating unions making much effort to 
retain key skills and expertise. 
 
Unemployment 
Table 3 presents a summary of our ILO unemployment 
forecasts under the three scenarios. With such significant 
job losses forecast then it is inevitable that forecast 
unemployment will rise appreciably. But the effect of job 
losses will not wholly be registered by a growth in 
measured unemployment. Some unemployed workers will 
leave the labour market either by ceasing to offer 
themselves for work, a drop in the activity rate, or by 
leaving the economy all together, migration. Our forecasts 
of unemployment reflect an average pass through from job 
loss to the measured increase in unemployment of around 
fifty per cent on average in any one year. On this basis 
unemployment in the central case rises from 137,000 in 
2008 to a peak of around 210,000 in 2010. On the worst 
case, unemployment peaks at 226,000 in 2011 and 
195,000 in 2010 in the optimistic case.  When expressed in 
rate terms these forecasts suggest that unemployment will 
rise to a 7.3% average in 2010 on the optimistic case, 7.9% 
in 2010 on the central case and 8.4% in 2010 and 8.5% in 
2011 on the worst-case scenario. It is worth stressing that 
unemployment is a lagging indicator of economic 
performance and continues to rise for some months, even 
quarters, after output has begun to recover. 
 
Brian Ashcroft 






 Martin Wolf, Japanese lessons for a world of balance-sheet deflation, 
Financial Times, 18 February 2009. 
2Richard Koo, The Holy Grail of Macroeconomics, John Wiley, 2008. 
3Such points have been consistently stressed by Martin Wolf in several of 
his FT articles and reflect the excellent analysis of global financial imbalance 
in his recent book Fixing Global Finance. 
4M Wolf (2008) Fixing Global Finance 
5HM Treasury (2009) Forecasts for the UK economy: A comparison of 
independent forecasts February 
6The so-called ‘Ricardian equivalence’ argument. 
7
 Zero will be regarded as the interest rate floor, although it need not be so if 
the authorities are prepared to effect negative interest rates by offering 
subsidies to borrowers and taxing lenders. This would of course be 
completely uncharted waters for the monetary authorities and the money 
supply implications would be unclear. 
11 Richard N. Foster  (2003) “Corporate Performance and Technological 
Change Through Investors' Eyes”, 
Research-Technology Management, Volume 46, Number 6, 1 November pp. 
36-43(8)
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Public Sector (221) Hotels and Catering (33)
Transport & Communication (70) Real Est. & Business Services (177)
Retail & Wholesale (106) Other Services (55)
Electronics (28) Financial Services (79)
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The global economy is experiencing a significant 
contraction due to the spreading effects of the sub-prime 
and financial crisis. This has greater effects in the main 
developed economies (US, UK, France, Germany and 
Japan) but the repercussions affect countries such as 
Russia, China and India, where a sharp downturn in global 
growth adversely impacts on their growth. Trade is down 
and both the IMF and the OECD have recently revised 
down their expectations for growth and trade. With global 
growth predicted to be only 0.5 per cent this year, the world 
is facing perhaps its deepest recession yet, although it is 
too early to call it a depression. Indeed the early co-
ordinated response of the main economies to deal 
effectively with the situation will probably avoid a 1930s 
style depression. This does not mean however that there 
will be a quick recovery – it is more likely that the recession 
will be deeper and longer than any previous recession, 
certainly since the end of World War II.  
 
The UK economy is not immune from this, and contracted 
by 1.5 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2008. The common 
expectation is that the first quarter of 2009 will also 
produce very weak data and that the economy will continue 
to shrink through 2009. Many forecasters expect the UK 
economy to contract by about 2.7 to 3.1 per cent this year. 
The UK recession is broad based affecting: banking, 
services manufacturing and construction. The Bank of 
England has lowered interest rates to 1 per cent – its 
lowest level ever since 1694 (the year of its founding) and 
is offering a number of other measures to support the 
economy:  the Special Liquidity Scheme and it intends to 
operate ‘Quantitative Easing’ – a method of extending the 
money supply without printing extra money. This will 
involve swapping government gilts for corporate bonds – a 
key objective of this is to reduce the interbank lending rate 
(Libor) so that lending between banks becomes easier. In 
the UK CPI inflation is expected to be close to 1 per cent 
although in the second half of 2009 deflation cannot be 
discounted. Public sector borrowing was set to be £78 
billion but this may grow to £87.5 billion by the end of the 
year as the government continues to support the economy. 
This weakens sterling considerably particularly against the 
Euro. In Oct-Dec 2008 UK unemployment hit an 11-year 
high at 1.97 million. It is unlikely that the UK will experience 
a V-shaped recovery and that 2010 will also be a very 
tough year. It is more probable that the UK will experience 
a longer recession with a slower recovery from the end of 
2010 onwards. 
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The Scottish economy 
Scottish GVA growth in 2008Q3 was -0.8 per cent leaving 
growth for the last four quarters on the preceding four 
quarters at 1.4 per cent. These data however are likely to 
be supplemented by very weak growth in 2008Q4 leaving 
growth for 2008 in the 0.5 to 0.7 per cent range. Exports 
are also likely to be poor. Manufacturing and services 
growth for 2008 are likely to be close to 1 per cent for the 
year based on the 2008Q3 data and assuming weaker data 
for 2008Q4 they may perform more poorly. Construction 
will probably contract by approximately 2.7 to 3 per cent in 
2008. Most service sectors had negative growth in 2008Q3 
and the expectation is for more of the same in 2008Q4. 
 
The employment rate in Scotland fell by 1.1 per cent on a 
year ago to 75.4 per cent for the three months to 
December 2008. Unemployment rose to 137,000 (5.1 per 
cent), up 0.3 per cent on the year. The claimant count 
measure of unemployment was 101,100 (3.7 per cent) in 
January 2009, up by 1.2 per cent annually. So as there is 
weakening growth in the economy, falling exports and a 
deteriorating labour market: it is clear that Scotland is in 
recession. The forecasts for the Scottish economy are 
made in the context of this worsening economic situation. 
 
Final demand 
The drivers of the economy are consumption; government 
spending; investment; tourism and exports (to the rest of 
the UK and to the rest of the world). For all three scenarios 
the main effects from the current economic climate are: 
 
x Investment declines sharply in 2009 and recovers 
slowly thereafter – in the central scenario this 
decline is slightly steeper and longer whereas in 
the last case the contraction is severe and growth 
is not seen until 2012; 
 
x Traditionally Scottish consumption holds up 
relatively well in a UK downturn – in this recession 
Scottish consumption indicators point to a 
significant fall in 2009 with mild recovery following. 
In the worse case scenario the decline is slightly 
sharper but more importantly it lasts considerably 
longer and it is 2012 before consumption returns 
to about 1 per cent growth; 
 
x Government consumption is held to be constant 
with a fixed budget to the Scottish Parliament. The 
UK government spending in Scotland will be 
substantial with increased benefit flows; a share of 
the fiscal stimulus (perhaps adding between 0.25 
to 0.3 per cent to GVA in 2009 and 2010) and 
rescue packages for RBS and Lloyds Banking 
Group (for HBOS); 
 
x Tourism is expected to perform poorly in terms of 
increased GVA – volumes might rise slightly but 
the assessment is that revenues from tourist 
expenditure will fall. Across the three scenarios 
this is reflected as a small negative effect except 
the last one where it is a large negative impact 
over two years and 
 
x Exports fall considerably, particularly to the UK as 
its economy shrinks. The expectation is that in the 
optimistic scenario recovery of all exports will take 
place in 2011; in the central scenario exports to 
the rest of the world are better than that to the rest 
of the UK and in the last case that recovery is 
weak in 2011 and does not really impact until 
2012.  
 
Background to the forecast 
The previous forecast was scenario based with a number 
of factors that potentially impact on economic performance. 
It was clear that if the banks returned to the government for 
more money for re-capitalisation then the worst case 
situation from the previous forecast would apply. That 
occurred in February and it also fits with poor bank lending 
conditions. On the up-side monetary policy has been quick 
to respond and is supportive as is fiscal policy. The 
Scottish labour market remains more buoyant than its UK 
counterpart but the rate of job shedding is accelerating. 
This may indicate that Scotland is simply catching up with 
the rest of the UK. Traditionally however, the Scottish 
economy does relatively better than the rest of the UK in a 
downturn but this particular recession appears to be much 
tougher and deeper than expected. It is the speed and the 
depth of the contraction that has taken most people by 
surprise. This is why most forecasters have shifted their 
expectations down considerably. The outcome of this may 
be that Scotland does not outperform the UK economy but 
different paths are possible thus a scenario forecast is the 
best tool to use in the current economic situation. The 
forecast is presented in three scenarios to reflect the very 
different paths that the economy could take, given 
particular events occurring. These scenarios are: 
 
x Optimistic; 
x Central and 
x Worst. 
 
The factors that support these scenarios are described 
briefly in each section. The scenarios are determined by 
the same variables used in the last forecast. As they were 
discussed in significant depth in the last FEC the factors 




The optimistic scenario 
This is the most probable result if the following outcomes 
actually prevail. The main influences under this scenario 
are: 
 
x The labour market in Scotland remains relatively 
buoyant and outperforms that of the UK with the 
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x House prices in Scotland are not as weak as that 
elsewhere in the UK and there are some early 
signs of some housing market segments showing 
growth as interest rates fall – this is the discerning 
and opportunistic buyer effects. 
employment rate being higher and the 
unemployment rate being lower than their UK 
counterparts; 
 
x Businesses can secure funding from banks and 
other financial institutions relatively more easily as 
bank lending improves significantly resulting in a 
smooth flow of funds in the Scottish economy; 
 
This scenario is perhaps closest to what is happening at 
the moment but of course there are many other variables 
that could change the course of the economy. This is why 
the worst case scenario is considered below. 
 
x Confidence holds up more in Scotland as 
spending in retail; investment and exports hold up. 




The worst case scenario 
 This scenario is presented because the impact of the 
financial crisis, and a sharp drop in the labour market, are 
important drivers. This early and sharp collapse of activity 
has repercussions for the path of recovery, as it tends to 
have a deeper recession with a slower recovery. The main 
factors here include: 
x External demand is a key factor here and 
supports export growth while tourism is not 
severely affected and 
 
x House prices are not depressed for too long and 
the expectation is for recovery to start by mid-
2010 but definitely by 2011. 
 
x The impact of the finance sector across the whole 
economy is severe and job losses in the economy 
come earlier in 2009 thus the support from the 
labour market weakens significantly; 
 
Critically appraising the above, it is clear that at the 
beginning of 2009, there are not many signs of lending 
becoming more efficient and similarly confidence is very 
weak at the moment. There are few indications of a quick 
recovery although in places the rate of decline in house 
prices has slowed significantly, and some companies are 
announcing jobs growth. The upside includes the labour 
market is in a relatively good state (compared to the UK) 
while monetary and fiscal policy remain supportive of 
economic recovery. These initial observations perhaps 
make it less likely that this outcome will prevail compared 
to the central forecast. 
 
x Confidence collapses early in 2009 and it is very 
difficult to stimulate the economy; 
 
x External demand is very weak up to the end of 
2010 and perhaps into 2011; 
 
x Investment contracts substantially and there is 
little expectation of growth here until 2012 and 
 
 x House prices in Scotland remain depressed for a 
longer period of time and as a result private 
housing investment continues to shrink until 2012. 
The central forecast 
In this scenario the main drivers are: 
 
 
x A further tranche of money has gone to re-
capitalise the banks but lending behaviour 
remains sticky; 
The outcome here is very disappointing and if this scenario 
were to come about there would be little growth in the 
economy until 2012 – a much longer and deeper recession 
than previously expected would take place.  
x Confidence is very low and firms face 




The forecast for Scottish GVA is negative for 2009 and 
2010 in all the scenarios. Table 1 presents the forecasts for 
each of the scenarios for the years 2008 to 2010. Data for 
growth per annum is also given for the period 2005-07 and 
for 2009-12, which demonstrates the marked difference 
between the two periods as the economy experiences a 
recession. Figure 1 plots the probable paths of GVA over 
the period 2008 to 2012 for the three scenarios. Figure 1 
demonstrates that in the worst case that the recession 
could last until 2011 with only weak growth thereafter. In 
the best possible outcome the recession lasts until 2010 
and growth of 1 per cent is achieved in 2011 and by 2012 
growth is approaching 2 per cent.
 
x External demand is also weak thus exports 
perform weakly and tourism revenues fall. The 
weakness of sterling cannot offset the poorer 
external demand; 
 
x The labour market is hit by a series of job losses 
but a significant number of workers remain in 
employment and this supports basic consumption; 
 
x The impact on the financial sector is quite sharp in 
2009 and 2010 and is felt across the rest of the 
economy and 
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Table 1:   Forecast GVA Growth in the three scenarios, 2008-2012 
 
 
GVA Growth (%) 2008 2009 2010 2005-071 2009-121 
      
Optimistic 0.65 -1.90 -0.43 2.32 0.79 
Central 0.59 -2.57 -1.21 2.32 0.15 
Worse 0.51 -3.07 -1.65 2.32 -0.45 
 
Source:  Fraser of Allander Institute, February 2009 
Note: 1This is per cent per annum 
 
 
Table 2:  Main forecasts of the Scottish economy (central scenario), 2008-2012 
 
 2008 2009 2010 2010-12 
     
GVA 0.59 -2.57 -1.21 0.15 
Agriculture 0.60 -2.85 -1.10 -0.14 
Manufacturing 0.60 -2.28 -1.34 -0.11 
Construction -2.73 -3.01 -1.21 0.14 
Services 0.98 -2.31 -1.30 0.17 
 
Source:  Fraser of Allander Institute, February 2009 
Note: 1This is per cent per annum. 
 
In the central forecast the recession lasts until 2010 and 
Table 2 presents forecasts for the sectors under this 
scenario. All sectors are forecast to have negative growth 
in 2009 and 2010 and to return to positive growth in 2011. 
In 2009 the forecast is for all sectors to contract by more 
than 2 per cent with construction declining by just over 3 
per cent. In 2010 the picture is similar – most sectors shrink 
by just over 1 per cent. This reflects the broad base of the 
current recession. Previous recessions have left the 
service sector relatively unscathed, not so this time as the 
downturn affects the whole economy. Within services the 
expectations are for financial services, retail, tourism, 
business services and other private services to do worse 
while the public sector and transport, communication 
services do relatively better. The crucial importance of a 
strong public sector is clearly seen at this time when it will 
support employment and provide spending in areas where 
private consumption and investment are severely curtailed. 
 
Figures 2a to 2c demonstrate the impacts on the 
construction, manufacturing and service sectors for each of 
the scenarios. For each broad sector the pattern of the 
scenarios is the same, all show longer recovery as the 
scenarios worsen. Previously in the Scottish economy key 
sectors including manufacturing, electronics, financial 
services or REBS have driven growth in the economy. It is 
likely in the near to medium future that this will not be the 
case. Growth will be more broadly balanced and the 
influence that ‘key’ sectors may have, will not be as strong 
as in previous years. Manufacturing is hit by both the 
severe slowing in domestic demand and the deterioration 
in external demand. Key exports like food, whisky, paper, 
electronics etc. have all seen activity and orders drop 
sharply. The construction sector has suffered and 
continues to experience a considerable downturn due to 
the lack of private residential demand as house prices have 
collapsed and the bulk of that market remains stagnant. 
Public sector investment continues to provide some 
stimulus to the economy but the current tranche of PPP 
schools, hospitals etc. are coming to an end. The new 
funding arrangements for major public works are not in 
place yet and projects of this nature take a long time in the 
planning stage.  
 
Services are badly hit because of the sharp downturn in 
economic activity in the economy. Retail sales data is 
confounding as it shows the sector holding up to a degree 
but in truth is due to heavy discounting. Large expenditures 
are not being made as people see the drop in interest rates 
as a continued run so in part it is having the opposite 
effect. People believe rates will fall further thus hold off 
spending. Similarly companies postpone investment. 
These actions simply exacerbate the situation where 
minimal spending takes place. Tourism is weak as incomes 
and demand in foreign countries decline. Visitor spend is 
down as is business conferencing. Other private services, 
services related to housing are all down. Business services 
are likewise adversely affected. Without doubt however the 
most significant impact is on the financial sector in 
Scotland. The losses posted by RBS and HBOS are 
massive and it is difficult to see these banks returning to 
the large profits and aggressive acquisitions strategy that 
previously existed. This does not mean that these two 
major banks will revert to simply retail banking. They will 
maintain a large degree of specialist services and where 
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profitable, retain some of their overseas operations. 
Investment banking and dealing in derivatives and 
securities may continue but there will be more stringent 
limits and supervision put in place both nationally and 
hopefully internationally, to ensure the risks of  such a 
catastrophe taking place again are minimised.  A mark of 
the international banking crisis is the extent to which most 
governments have taken substantial ownership of banks 
and nationalisation is widely accepted as necessary. As it 
is, this is what has happened and the interesting question 
is ‘how does the economy move forward so that this is not 
repeated and a situation of sustainable growth is 
achieved?’ 
 
In going forward there are two key factors to consider: 
 
x The strength of external demand – if this picks up 
then it will feed into exports and help 
manufacturing significantly. Tourism would also 
benefit if as predicted sterling remains weak. This 
would help stimulate retail and hotels & catering 
as well as other private services and 
 
x The speed and number of jobs lost in the 
beginning of 2009 is absolutely crucial. As time 
goes on the more people who remain in 
employment means that incomes are supported, 
as is consumption. Large numbers of people 
being ejected from the labour market will lead to a 
double whammy of a bigger strain on public 
finances (less taxes and more benefit spending) 
as well as the reduction on income thus 
weakening consumption and investment. On a 
large scale these have significant impacts on the 
economy going forward and have potentially very 
serious effects on the economy. 
 
Overall, the forecast for the Scottish economy is cautious 
but realistic. There is no clear way forward that indicates 
that the economy will go in a particular direction or grow at 
a particular rate. Each of the scenarios indicates a 
probable path that the economy could take. The central 
forecast is the most likely of them all. The downside risks 
would lead to the worse case scenario while it is unlikely 
that the Scottish economy can achieve the most optimistic 
case. If external demand remains very weak for a 
prolonged period and labour shedding is quick and jobs 
growth is sluggish for a couple of years then the worst case 




Our forecasts of employment (for the central scenario) are 
presented in Table 3 with the net employment change 
figure in brackets. The employment figures are calibrated 
on the latest Employers’ Quarterly Survey Series as given 
in Table 6.06 in Economic and Labour Market Review, 
National Statistics.  
 
In the central forecast employment is forecast to decline by 
14,200 in 2008; by 94,200 in 2009 and by 51,400 in 2010. 
If this were to happen the economy would be facing one of 
the most serious job loss periods it has experienced. The 
forecast job loss for the period 2009-12 in this scenario is 
128,100 compared to 82,400 in the optimistic scenario. If 
the economy has a deep and prolonged recession (the 
worst case) then job loss over 2009-12 is forecast to be 
168,000. It appears that it will be impractical for the 
economy to shed this quantity of jobs without impacting 
adversely on unemployment (the forecasts of 
unemployment are presented in Table 4). 
 
In all the scenarios the service sector sheds a significant 
amount of jobs. The forecast is for services to lose 74,400 
in 2009 and a further 39,600 in 2010. This represents 78.9 
per cent of all job losses in 2009 and the comparative 
figure for 2010 is 77 per cent. The most significant jobs 
loss comes in services comes from the financial services 
sector. The assumption of the central forecast is that there 
is a significant jobs loss in both 2009 and 2010 from 
financial services. This could total 24,700 in 2009 and 
18,900 in 2010. This is because the sector will have some 
immediate costs to cut and these come mostly in 2009. As 
banks consolidate and review their activities then efficiency 
savings will bite in 2010 as cost-cutting continues. REBS 
also faces a major shakeout in 2009 with the forecast loss 
of 28,700 jobs. In the worst case scenario the jobs loss is 
considerable in both years, with a shedding of 25,200 and 
22,400 in 2010 for financial services. Elsewhere in this 
service sector the jobs loss is weighted towards 2009 and 
REBS is forecast to lose 33,000 jobs but only 11,200 in the 
year 2010. Similarly, retail is forecast to lose 16,300 jobs in 
2009 but less in 2010; 10,900.  
 
The construction sector is forecast to lose 8,000 jobs in 
2009 under the central forecast but this could be as high as 
8,800 in the worst case scenario. Under this scenario it 
loses 4,300 jobs in 2010 compared to 2,900 in the central 
case. 
 
Manufacturing job losses are spread across the sector 
relatively evenly. The exceptions to this are: ORNF, 
chemicals and transport equipment. The former two shed 
only a small number of jobs while transport equipment is 
buoyed by positive job growth of 1,600 in 2009 due to 
shipbuilding orders for naval vessels on the Clyde and at 
Rosyth. Over the forecast period manufacturing is forecast 
to shed 14,400 jobs in the central scenario but this could 
be as high as 20,100 if the worst case prevails. The other 
sectors, especially those with export markets, tend to have 
much higher job losses forecast as activity reduces 
sharply. It is unlikely that firms will hoard labour for a longer 
time and this is a key danger as skills will be lost as jobs 
are shed swelling the ranks of the unemployed.  
 
Unemployment 
We present our forecasts of unemployment in Table 4. 
Both the ILO measure and claimant count measure are 
FEBRUARY 2009 PAGE 23 
FRASER ECONOMIC COMMENTARY 



















Source:  Fraser of Allander Institute, February 2009 
 




















Source:  Fraser of Allander Institute, February 2009 
 
PAGE 24 VOLUME 32 NUMBER 3 
FRASER ECONOMIC COMMENTARY 
Table 3:  Forecasts of Scottish employment (000s) and net employment change, (central scenario) 2008-2012 
 
 2008 2009 2010 2009-12 
Total Employment 2,384.6 2,290.4 2,239.0  
 (-14,200) (-94,200) (-51,400) (-128,100) 
Agriculture 33.3 31.1 29.0  
 (4,000) (-2,200) (-2,100) (-2,400) 
Manufacturing 216.3 207.4 201.4  
 (-4,700) (-8,900) (-6,100) (-14,400) 
Construction 137.2 129.3 126.3  
 (-2,000) (-8,000) (-3,000) (1,500) 
Services 1,955.8 1,881.4 1,841.8  
 (-10,800) (-83,500) (-48,500) (-100,900) 
 




Table 4:  Forecasts of Scottish Unemployment (Central Scenario), 2008-2010 
 
 2008 2009 2010 
ILO Unemployment 137,200 184,400 209,900 
Rate 5.1% 6.9% 7.9% 
Claimant Count 77,800 110,600 125,900 
Rate 2.9% 3.9% 4.3% 
 



















Source: Fraser of Allander Institute, February 2009 
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given. The preferred measure of unemployment however is 
ILO unemployment as given by the LFS. Figure 3 illustrates 
the different outcomes for claimant count unemployment in 
the three scenarios. 
 
The forecast for unemployment has changed somewhat 
over the most recent period. It had been the case that the 
Scottish labour market had been outperforming the UK 
labour market and still does in relative terms. This had led 
to an employment rate that was higher than that of the UK 
and unemployment that was at historically low levels. The 
forecast for the central scenario is that unemployment will 
rise from 5.1 per cent in 2008 to 7.9 per cent in 2010 
before falling at a much slower rate to 7.5 in 2012. In the 
worst case scenario unemployment is forecast to peak at 
8.5 per cent in 2011 indicating the different profile of 
unemployment in this situation. The claimant count forecast 
is for unemployment to peak at 125,900 (4.3 per cent) in 
2009 whereas the forecast for the worst case scenario is 
that it is at its highest in 2011 at 135,700 (4.7 per cent). 
Claimant count unemployment currently stands at 77,800 
(2.9 per cent) for 2008. 
 
Figure 3 show the likely paths unemployment could take, 
where the first two scenarios plateau over 2010 to 2011. 
The change in the worst case scenario is that it continues 
to rise but does not have a flat portion. Using the claimant 
count measure more people will fall into inactivity and stop 
claiming benefits over protracted periods of time. Data from 
previous recessions indicate that in a severe recession 
(say that of the 1980s in Scotland) unemployment 
continues to rise after such a deep and long recession. So 
in the case of the worst scenario unemployment may 
continue to climb even after growth and jobs creation takes 
place. Deskilling, jobs mismatch and discouraged workers 
all add to this. 
 
Kenneth Low 
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All of the major Scottish Business Surveys showed a 
further sharp deterioration in the private sector economy 
during the latter part of 2008 and into 2009.  The latest 
Lloyds TSB Scotland Business Monitor (Issue 44 
September – November 2008) reported the downturn in the 
Scottish economy intensified in late summer and winter 
2008. “The implication is that growth in the private sector of 
the Scottish economy has not only slowed dramatically but 
has reversed into a contraction. This is the most negative 
result in eleven years of the Business Monitor.”   The PMI 
Scotland Report (Royal Bank of Scotland (January 2009) 
found that “Output and new business both contracted at 
near –record rates and, despite backlogs of work being 
reduced at the fastest pace in the eleven-year history, staff 
were shed at the strongest rate on record.”   The Scottish 
Chambers’ Business Survey noted “The results for the 
fourth quarter 2008 are the most depressed results 
recorded since the survey commenced in 1984. This is the 
first time that negative trends have been recorded for the 
key indicators in all sectors.”  According to the fourth 
quarter 2008 Quarterly Review of the engineering industry 
in Scotland; “The global financial crisis has finally caught 
up with the Scottish manufacturing engineering sector. For 
the first time in five years output volume and recruitment 
figures are negative” The latest Scottish Industrial Trends 
Survey published by CBI Scotland (Quarter 4 2008 date) 
pointed to “sharp deterioration in the trends of new orders 
and output among Scottish manufacturers, bringing the 
picture here back in line with the UK average. “ 
 
 
Oil and Gas Sector 
Activity in the UK oil and gas sector slowed in slightly in 
2008 after a period of increased investment, activity and 
employment. Underpinning these trends has been the 
relentless increase in oil prices, which had risen from an 
average of $54 per barrel in January 2007 to an average of 
over $90 per barrel by January 2008 peaking at $147 in 
July 2008.  In early 2008 a number of institutions were 
confidently predicting that prices would reach over $200 
per barrel by the end of 2008.  In reality average oil prices 
tumbled to $34 per barrel in December 2008 and current 
central predictions are for oil prices to be in the region of 
$30 – 45 per barrel in 2009. The Oil and Gas UK Activity 
Survey (published February 2009) noted a slight reduction 
(6%) in investment levels in 2008 compared to 2007, and 
expects reduced investment and a reduction in the number 
and scope of sanctioned investment in 2009, reflecting the 
declining price of oil and the availability of credit, and called 
for measures to prevent the effects of the global recession 
combined with the banking crisis from dampening new 
investment in the recovery of the UK’s oil and gas 
reserves. 
 
Upstream and downstream capital costs have risen 
substantially in the global oil industry.  The IHS Cambridge 
Energy Research Associates (IHS CERA) Upstream 
Capital Costs Index (UCCI) reported new record highs, with 
the index at 210 (base 100 in 2000). However, IHS CERA 
noted some moderation in September and October which 
‘points to a precursor to a downward turn in the direction of 
the UCCI’ (CERA press release Dec 2008). 
 
Evidence from the 10th Oil and Gas Survey (Aberdeen & 
Grampian Chamber of Commerce, February 2009) noted 
that the majority of contractors engaged in UKCS activity 
continued to report working at or above optimum levels, but 
there are expectations that these trends will weaken in 
2009 and that the majority of operators expect to reduce 
total employment levels in 2009, with some reduction in the 
use of contract and temporary staffs. A net balance of 
contractors expect to increase total and permanent 
employment in 2009, but likewise expect to make less use 
of temporary and contract staffs. 
 
The 10th Oil and Gas Survey also noted that the business 
strategy for some smaller exploration and production 
companies that relied on raising capital to finance 
exploration spending is likely to be less sustainable in the 
current climate of substantially reduced oil prices and a 
reduction in capital availability, or increased costs of 
capital. This problem is likely to be more acute in those 
areas where costs and lift costs are high. Additionally the 
survey concluded that the resulting decline in share prices 
has increased the probability of a wave of consolidation in 
the sector and of new overseas companies purchasing 
North Sea assets and contractors. All operators and 87% 
of contractors shared the view that the current credit issues 
would lead to more mergers and consolidation in the UKCS 
and all believe it will have an adverse effect on working 
capital and activity. In addition whilst the economic 
downturn will lead to spare capacity in the short term; the 
combination of financial constraints, sector consolidation 
and low prices will hinder new investment and oil markets 
will tighten in the medium term and a new upward price 
cycle is likely to emerge in a context of reduced investment 




The Lloyds TSB Scotland Business Monitor - Issue 44 to 
November 2008, showed that production businesses 
showed a marked decline, displaying a worsening 
performance. In the latest quarter, 20% of firms 
experienced an increase in turnover, 37% a static position 
and 43% a decline giving a net balance of -23%. This 
compared unfavourably to the +6% of the previous quarter 
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and was significantly down on the +14% of the same 
quarter one year ago.  
 
Manufacturing 
The surveys differed in terms of when in 2008 orders 
turned down and the rate of decline accelerated. The 
Scottish Chambers’ Business Survey noted a sharp drop in 
the level of total orders in q2 2008 and a further sharp drop 
in quarter 4 2008. The PMI data (not seasonally adjusted) 
likewise indicated a drop in orders in q2, a sharper drop in 
q3 and then a similar drop in q4 2008. In contrast Scottish 
Engineering recorded rising trends in new orders in q1 and 
q2 (although the rate of increase eased in q2), followed by 
a decline in q3 and a sharper decline in q4 2008. 
 
Confidence and Orders 
The Scottish Chambers’ Business Survey reported that 
during the fourth quarter business confidence continued to 
deteriorate for a net of firms in all size bands. The 
proportion of firms reporting declining levels of business 
confidence in the fourth quarter is the highest reported in 
the history of the survey. The actual and expected trends in 
total orders in the second half of 2008 are the weakest ever 
recorded. Weakening trends in orders were again reported 
by a net of firms in all size bands and these trends are 
expected to continue through the next year. 
 
Scottish Chambers reported that declining trends in the 
level of work in progress continued and are expected to 
deepen further in the first quarter of 2009.  Average 
capacity remained at 73.6%, some 5 percentage points 
lower than a year ago, and once again 65% reported 
capacity used was below preferred levels. In both the 3rd 
and 4th quarters of 2008 the expectations as to the trends 
in orders and turnover for the next twelve months are the 
weakest reported in the history of the survey. However, 
pressures to raise prices eased significantly.   
 
The latest Scottish Industrial Trends Survey by CBI 
Scotland (Quarter 4 2008) pointed to sharp deterioration in 
the trends of new orders and output among Scottish 
manufacturers. Output continued to fall and the contraction 
intensified. The proportion of respondents reporting 
sales/orders as a constraint on output almost doubled 
during the past two surveys.  Total new order volumes fell 
at their sharpest rate since October 2001 – a notable 
deterioration from the comparatively modest decline seen 
in the previous survey. A slightly weaker fall is anticipated 
next quarter, with expectations for domestic orders 
appearing to have stabilised somewhat. It was in export 
markets that the trend in orders deteriorated most 
noticeably, and this is expected to continue as the global 
recession deepens. The CBI reported that export prospects 
for Scottish firms appear to be deteriorating faster than 
across the UK as a whole.  
 
The Royal Bank of Scotland PMI Scotland (January 2009) 
report noted the sharpest fall in manufacturing production 
in eleven years of data collection.  The main reason given 
for the decline was a fall in new business with the report 
highlighting the steepest decline in new order books in the 
history of the survey.  The survey also showed a continued 
downturn in export orders albeit at a slower rate of decline 
than in the previous survey. 
 
Costs/Prices 
For Scottish Chambers’ respondents pressure to raise 
prices eased significantly from more than 80% anticipating 
price increases in quarter 3 2008 to 29% in quarter 4.  PMI 
Scotland report indicated that prices had broadly remained 
unchanged with firms claiming that rising costs had left 
them unable to lower charges due to rising competition. 
 
Scottish Engineering Quarterly review noted that prices 
were holding up well in UK markets but export prices were 
slightly down although margins remained negative in both 
UK and export markets. Prices are expected to fall for a net 
of firms in the latest Scottish Industrial Trends Survey by 
CBI Scotland.  Firms reported that costs had continued to 
rise albeit at a slower rate than in previous surveys. 
 
Employment 
Amongst Scottish Chambers’ manufacturing respondents 
changes to employment levels were reported by 33% of 
which 23% reported declining employment; 23.3% reported 
reductions in total hours worked. Scottish Engineering 
reported that staffing levels in general, but notably in small 
companies, were negative. PMI Scotland noted that 27% of 
manufacturing firms recorded a fall in employment. CBI 
Industrial Trends Survey on the other hand reported that 
employment had remained broadly unchanged for almost a 
year despite expectations in the past two surveys that 




Confidence and Orders 
The Scottish Chambers’ Business Survey noted that for a 
further quarter 80% of construction firms reported being 
less confident than a year ago, and the net trend in 
business confidence was the lowest recorded in the history 
of the survey.  The declining trend in new contracts 
accelerated further in the fourth quarter, with a sharp 
downturn in the trends in public sector, in private 
commercial and domestic/house build contracts. Now only 
28% (41%, 52%, 69%, and 71% in the previous four 
quarters) expect level or rising trends in the level of work 
through the next six months. Average capacity declined to 
72%, the lowest figure recorded, a decline of 18 
percentage points over the year. 43% reported and 59% 
expect a declining trend in the level of work in progress, 
again the weakest trends in the history of the survey. The 
UK PMI Construction index (January 2009) likewise noted 
continued contraction in the sector, but suggested the rate 
of slowdown was easing and that confidence, although 
falling, was easing at a more modest rate than in preceding 
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months, although it would be premature to interpret these 
signs as heralding a recovery of the sector.  
 
Costs/Prices 
For respondents to the Scottish Chambers Business 
Survey, expectations as to turnover trends over the next 
year have weakened significantly over the past three 
quarters. In the fourth quarter a net of 65% (37% and 25% 
in the previous two quarters two) anticipate declining 
turnover trends over the next year (in contrast rising net 
trends of 3%, 10% and 29% in the preceding three 
quarters). A net of -78% (-54%, -49% and -3% in the 
previous three quarters) anticipate declining profitability 
over the next twelve months. 83% of construction firms 




Almost two thirds of Scottish Chambers’ construction firms 
reported reducing employment and 73% reducing overtime 
in the fourth quarter. Recruitment was at the lowest level 
since the start of the survey. 
 
The Service Sector 
The PMI Scotland Report indicated that service sector 
activity declined for the tenth consecutive month although 
the rate of decline eased in January.  The Lloyds TSB 
Scotland Business Monitor to November 2008 noted that 
Service businesses were more severely affected by the 
downturn than production businesses. For the last three 
months, the net balance on turnover of service businesses 
was -35%. This is significantly down on the -20% of the 
previous quarter and the +18% of the same quarter one 
year ago. The net balance on turnover for service 
businesses has now fallen for six consecutive quarters to 
the lowest level ever recorded in the 11 years of the 
Business Monitor. Compared to production firms service 
businesses were again more pessimistic with the overall 
net balance for increasing turnover in the next six months 
at -50% compared to the -34% of the previous quarter and 
the +13% of the same quarter one year ago. Only 10% of 
service business expect turnover to increase in the next six 




Optimism and Sales 
Business confidence among Scottish Chambers 
respondents fell to unprecedented levels in the fourth 
quarter. The proportion reporting and expecting declining 
sales was the highest ever reported in the history of the 
survey.  Over two thirds of respondents reported declining 
sales trends and over 80% expect sales to ease in the first 
quarter of 2009. 
 
The SRC Scottish Retail Sales Monitor (December 2008) 
reported that like-for-like sales in December were 0.8% 
higher than in December 2007, when they had risen 0.4%. 
Total sales in December were 3.4% up on a year ago. The 
small like-for-like increase was the best since June, but 
was largely driven by food sales, discounts and clearance 
sales. Food sales showed stronger growth but non-food 




Scottish Chamber of Commerce retail respondents 
reported that cost pressures were less evident in the fourth 
quarter. A net of -69% of retailers anticipate declining 
turnover, and a net of -72% (-49% in the previous quarter) 
anticipate declining profitability over the next year, 
suggesting rising pressures on margins in 2009. This was 
echoed in the Scottish Retail sales Monitor (December 
2008) which noted “Widespread promotions and discounts 
for all goods put immense pressure on margins. With 
mounting fears about jobs and plummeting consumer 
confidence these figures provide little reassurance about 
Scottish retail’s prospects for 2009”. 
 
Employment 
Changes in employment levels were reported by 44% of 
Scottish Chamber respondents (13% in the previous 
quarter) and the proportion reducing employment was the 
highest recorded. The trends in employment indicated 
continuing declining trends in full time, temporary and 





Optimism and Demand 
For a further quarter concerns as to the business situation 
were widely reported by respondents in the Scottish 
Chambers’ Business Survey. Over 70% reported lower 
levels of business confidence, the most widely reported 
figure since 2001. The current declining trend in business 
confidence emerged in 2007 q4, and the proportions 
reporting declining trends more than doubled in the fourth 
quarter. The net trends in demand were weaker than in the 
previous fourth quarters of 1997 - 2007. Only 12.5% 
reported increased demand for accommodation, 7% 
increased numbers in restaurants and 9% increased 
demand for function/conference facilities. Average 
occupancy at 58% was lower than in the fourth quarters of 
2006 - 2007, but broadly similar to that of q4 2005 and 
above that for q4 2001.  Overall tourist demand accounted 
for 38.5% of total demand with business trade generating 
27.3% and the balance was local demand. 
 
A net of -37% Scottish Chamber of Commerce firms 
reported declining turnover trends (compared to a decline 
of -33%, -8% and increases of 10% and 38% in the 
previous quarters) and a net of -48% (-43.5%, -22.4%,  
-34% and -5% in the previous four quarters) reported falling 
trends in margins. Discounting of room rates was more 
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widespread than expected and 47% expect to discount 
room rates in the first quarter. 
 
Employment 
Changes in employment levels were reported by 52% of 
Scottish Chamber respondents. Net declining trends in full 
time, part time, seasonal and overtime working were 
reported, and the proportions recruiting staff was lower 
than for the past ten years. 
 
Outlook 
All surveys continue to note the slowing down in the 
Scottish economy becoming more evident over the fourth 
quarter, with the services sector continuing to be more 


























Current trends in Scottish Business are regularly reported by a 
number of business surveys. This report draws on: 
 
1. The Confederation of British Industries Scottish Industrial 
Trends Survey for the quarter to December 
2008; 
2.  Lloyds TSB Business Monitor for the quarter to November 2008 
and expectations to May 2009; 
3. Scottish Engineering’s Quarterly Review for the fourth quarter 
2008; 
4. The Royal Bank of Scotland’s Monthly Purchasing Managers’ 
Index to end January 2009; 
5. The Scottish Retail Consortium’s Monthly Scottish Retail Sales 
Monitor for December 2008; 
6. The Scottish Chambers of Commerce Quarterly Business 
Survey, reports for the fourth quarter of 2008; 
7. Oil & Gas UK 2008 Activity Survey; 
8. 10th Oil and Gas Survey (Aberdeen & Grampian Chamber of 
Commerce, February 2009). 
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Current interest in the Scottish labour market inevitably 
focuses on the unemployment figures, and in this issue, in 
addition to noting recent changes in Scottish labour market 
trends, we take a wider view of Scottish labour market 
issues.   
 
The Scottish labour market enters the recession following a 
prolonged period of rising numbers in employment and 
declining levels of unemployment, the latter down from 
157,000 in 2001 to 113,000 in 2008 (Scottish Economic 
Statistics, 2008), falling from 6.2% in 2001 to 4.2% in 2008 
(Scottish Economic Statistics, 2008). Over the same period 
activity rates have consistently risen. 
 
 
Trends in the Scottish claimant count (1977- 
2008) 
Inevitably the current climate invites comparisons with the 
patterns and unemployment levels in previous recessions. 
A consistent trend of the claimant count can be used to 
give some indications, although differences between the 
claimant count and the higher numbers generated using 
the ILO definition of unemployment, together with changing 
levels in activity rates and the impact of job creation 
measures need to be borne in mind (see figure 1). 
 
In the recession of 1974 – 1975 the claimant count 
fluctuated through 1974, rose consistently through 1975, 
1976 and 1977 and only began to decline in January 1978. 
In April 1974 Scottish it stood at 69,500, rising to 73,000 in 
September, but falling back to 69,000 in December 1974. 
The claimant count rose consistently through 1975 
reaching 104,500 in December 1975, and 131,200 by 
December 1976 and peaked at 147,300 in December 
1977, easing by some 11,800 through 1978 to 135,500 by 
December 1978. 
 
In the recession of 1980 – 1981 the claimant count had 
already began to increase from September 1979 (137,800), 
and rose consistently through 1981 (reaching 262,200 by 
December 1981), 1982 (297,900 December 1982) and 
1983 (298,200 December 1983), and a general upward 
trend continued through to January 1987 when 
unemployment peaked at 334,700.  
 
The rise in the claimant count in the 1991 recession was 
much more modest, although the difference between the 
claimant count and ILO based measure of unemployment 
was increasing. The claimant count eased through 1987 to 
October 1990 (197,300) but rose month on month to 
December 1992 peaking at 248,100 before beginning to 
decline. By May 1995 it had fallen to under 200,000 and 
from December 2002 – July 2003 fluctuating around 
100,000, falling to under 90,000 by October 2004, to under 




A flexible labour market 
Patterns of work have changed significantly over the past 
thirty years as a more flexible labour market and flexible 
working arrangements have emerged. Within the EU the 
UK is recognised as having one of the most flexible and 
lightly regulated labour markets in the EU and this has 
been regarded as contributing to increasing numbers in 
employment.    
 
The deregulation of the labour market coupled with the rise 
in non standard hours, part time employment, shift work, 
annualised hours, flexible hours, temporary, sub 
contracting and self employment have arguably changed 
the employment landscape and are likely to impact on both 
the trends and patterns of unemployment. Annualised 
hours offer companies the ability to vary hours worked over 
the year to meet short term fluctuations in demand, and for 
the major retailers, with large numbers of part time staffs 
working a variety of shift patterns, automated labour 
scheduling programmes afford the ability to significantly 
vary the total numbers of hours worked without changing 
the numbers employed. Scottish data for 2008 indicates 
that there were 628,000 part time workers, 284,000 self 
employed and some 10,000 unpaid family workers. 
Detailed Scottish data on shift patterns, temporary, agency 
and sub contract is less readily available. Nevertheless, the 
Review of Scottish Business Surveys indicates the use of 
temporary and sub contracting employment terms have 
enabled companies in a number of sectors to re-adjust total 
employment, to meet declining demand, and at the same 
time to endeavour to retain core skills.  
 
The promotion of flexible working arrangements and the 
general deregulation of the labour market has prompted 
considerable debate as to their desirability and usage in 
practice. As unemployment increases concern has re-
emerged as to the extent to which flexibility is equated with 
insecure employment. Flexible labour and non standard 
employment have been variously termed ‘precarious 
employment’, ‘contingent work’, as forming part of the 
‘peripheral’ or ‘insecure’ workforce, and as such are 
amongst the first groups to experience unemployment in a 
recession.  Within the EU there is the concern with 
‘flexicurity’ the balance of flexibility and security in the 
labour market, of meeting the employers’ need for flexibility 
and employees’ need for security in employment 
(Flexicurity and Industrial Relations, European Foundation 
for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 
2008). 
 
Before the onset of the current recession Futureskills 
Scotland noted (The Scottish Labour Market 2006) that 
whilst employment growth is expected to be modest over 
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Table 1:  Headline indicators of Scottish and UK labour market, Q4 2008 
 

















Level (000s) 2,532 -0.8 -0.2 29.361  -0.2 -0.1 Employment* 
Rate (%) 75.4 -0.9 -1.1 74.1 -0.3 -0.7 
        
Level (000s)          137 9.2 5.9 1971 8.0 23 
Unemployment** 
Rate (%) 5.1 0.4 0.3 6.3 0.4 1.1 
        
Level (000s)       2,669 -0.3 0.1 31,333  0.4 1.2 
Activity* 
Rate (%) 79.7 -0.5 -0.9 79.2 0.1 0.2 
        
Level (000s)         653 2.6 4.8 7,858 -0.4 -0.6 
Inactivity*** 
Rate (%) 20.3 0.5 0.9       20.8  0.5 -0.2 
 
Source: Labour Market Statistics (First Release), Scotland and UK, Feb 2009  
 
  * Levels are for those aged 16+, while rates are for those of working age (16-59/64) 
 ** Levels and rates are for those aged 16+, rates are proportion of economically active. 












Table 2:  Employee jobs by industry, Scotland, June 2008 
 
All jobs (not 
seasonally 





















Section  A-O A,B C,E D F H-K L-O 
Sep 05 2,373 2,373 32 37 232 129 1,102 842 
Sep 06 2,361 2,360 33 38 224 138 1,085 841 
Sep 07 2,389 2,389 33 43 222 139 1,108 844 
Dec 07 2,391 2,400 25 42 220 139 1,127 847 
Mar 08 2,392 2,382 28 42 218 137 1,109 849 
Jun 08  2,396 2,396 35 42 216 136 1,114 853 
Sep 08 2,387 2,388 35 41 216 138 1,105 852 
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The next ten years ‘this moderate growth masks significant 
opportunities (demand), as existing workers leave the 
Scottish labour market through migration, ill health and 
early retirement’. There will be a need to replace these 
workers and to meet the ‘middle ranking challenge’ of 
attracting the necessary numbers of skilled staff. Retaining 
the skills base, the balance of skills and experience 
necessary to grow after the recession, will be a significant 
issue for some sectors, especially those with shortages in 
key skills and with an aging workforce.  
.  
The move towards more flexible labour markets has also 
reflected a move towards financial flexibility, or variable 
payment systems, with pay less linked to collective 
bargaining and national rates, as in the 1970s, and 
increasingly linked to combinations of individual and 
company performance. The Workplace Employment 
Relations Survey (2004) found performance related 
payment arrangements in 40% of UK workplaces, ‘37% of 
private sector workplaces gave profit related payments or 
bonuses, whilst 21% operated employee share schemes’ 
(Inside the Workplace: First Findings from the 2004 
Workplace Employment Relations Survey). More recent 
data suggests that bonus schemes are more widespread. 
The CIPD Annual Reward Survey (2009), a more limited 
survey, reported that 70% of respondents used a cash 
based bonus or incentive plan to reward employees, this 
ranged from 33% in the Public services to 89% in the 
private services sector, where over 80% of executive board 
members and over 70% of senior managers, middle 
management and clerical/technical were covered by bonus 
scheme, where over 80% of executive board members and 
over 70% of senior managers, middle management and 
clerical/technical were covered by bonus schemes. The 
survey data suggests not only a wide range in the potential 
and maximum possible bonuses as a percentage of base 
salary. The CIPD survey found that 43% of private sector 
respondents offered some form of employee share 
ownership scheme.  
 
 
Recent trends and statistics  
Comparable figures on the labour market1 between 
Scotland and the United Kingdom in the fourth quarter of 
2008 are summarised in Table 1. Labour Force Survey 
(LFS) data show that in the final three months of 2008 the 
level of employment in Scotland fell by 0.8 per cent, to 
2,532 thousand. Over the year to December 2008, 
employment in Scotland fell by 6 thousand, approximately 
0.2 per cent. For the same period, UK employment fell by 
0.3%. The Scottish employment rate – those in 
employment as a percentage of the working age population 
– was 75.4 per cent, down 1.1 per cent compared to one 
year earlier.  
 
Figure 2 provides an account of Scottish quarterly LFS 
employment over a sixteen-year period to the most recent 
quarter. Employment levels remain close to historical 
highs, reached in Q2 2007.  
Table 1 shows that for Scotland the preferred International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) measure of unemployment rose 
by 9.2 per cent to 137 thousand, between the third and 
fourth quarters of 2008. This equates to a 5.9 per cent 
annual increase  in the number unemployed under this 
measure2. The ILO unemployment rate rose in the three 
months to December 2008 and now stands at 5.1 per cent. 
This represents a rise of 0.4 percentage points over the 
last quarter and a rise of 0.3 percentage points relative to 
the same period a year earlier. The comparable ILO 
unemployment rate for the UK stands at 6.3 per cent, and 
is up 0.4 per cent over the most recent quarter, and up 1.1 
per cent over the year.  
 
The economically active workforce includes those 
individuals actively seeking employment and those 
currently in employment (i.e. self-employed, government 
employed, unpaid family workers and those on training 
programmes). Table 1 shows that the level of the 
economically active fell by 0.3 per cent between Q3 2008 
and Q4 2008. There were 2,669 thousand economically 
active people in Scotland during Q4 2008. This comprised 
2,532 thousand in employment and 137 thousand ILO 
unemployed. The level for those of working age 
economically inactive rose in the last quarter, up 2.6 per 
cent on the previous quarter to 653 thousand people. This 
indicates an increase of 4.8 per cent in the number of 
people of working age economically inactive over the last 
year.  
 
The most recent (seasonally adjusted) figure for 
Jobseekers allowance claimants in Scotland stood at 101.1 
thousand in January 2009, up 3.4 thousand from the 
previous month. The claimant count rate in January 2009 
stood at 3.7 per cent. This is up 0.1 percentage point from 
the previous month, but up 1.2 percentage points over the 
year. In April 2008, the Scottish claimant count rate was 
identical to the UK claimant count rate at 2.5 per cent, but 
both have risen in the last five months. The UK claimant 
count rate in January 2009 was 3.8 per cent. Figure 5 
shows the claimant count rates for Scotland and the UK 
since comparable records began in April 1974.  
 
Figure 3 shows net flows to Jobseekers Allowance in 
Scotland between November 1988 and the most recent 
data (January 2009). The reduction in the claimant count 
unemployment over recent years can be seen by the 
greater outflows than inflows over much of this time period. 
The recent sharp increase in claimant count levels can be 
seen by the increase in the scale of inflows to Jobseekers 
allowance since March 2008. 
  
The most recent figures for the number of employee jobs 
by industrial activity are detailed in Table 2. Employee job 
figures are a measure of jobs rather than people. Total 
seasonally adjusted employee jobs for the quarter ending 
September 2008 stood at 2,387 thousand. The number of 
jobs in the manufacturing industry continues to fall, and 
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now stands at 216 thousand, the same as the previous 
quarter, and down 6 thousand against the same quarter
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Source:  Labour Force Survey, National Statistics 
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Source:  National Statistics (accessed through Nomisweb) 
 
 
one year earlier. The number of jobs in the service industry 
fell by 9 thousand over the last quarter to 1,105 thousand, 
and there are now 2 thousand fewer jobs in the service 




Scotland’s labour market continues to perform reasonably 
well; the trend in unemployment is increasing, but as yet 
not at much higher rates.  However there are signs that the 
unemployment rate will increase more strongly through 
2009. As yet it is unclear as to how the more flexible and 
deregulated labour market that has emerged over the past 
25 years will impact on the pattern and level of 
unemployment; there are stronger signs that it may affect 
more adversely those employed on more flexible 
employment terms. At the company level policies to ensure 
the retention of key skills and expertise will be a challenge, 
especially where these are distributed towards the older 





1The Census 2001-consistent population figures at local authority 
level were released in February 2003. This has allowed the 
production of interim regional LFS estimates. The population data 
only cover the periods up to mid-2001. The data presented here 
are taken mainly from Labour Market Statistics, May 2008 and are 
consistent with the updated LFS data available on NOMIS from 
Summer 2004. Labour Market Statistics continue to report data for 
Scotland at the quarterly level, so this will continue to form the 
basis of our analysis of movements in the labour market between 
quarters.  
2The Labour Force Survey definition of ILO unemployment takes 
precedence over the claimant count measure. ILO unemployment 
is much less sensitive to changes in the regulations governing 
unemployment benefit, and conforms to a widely accepted 
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Opinions expressed in economic 
perspectives are those of the authors and 
not necessarily those of the Fraser of 
Allander Institute 
A recommendation on 
how the method of 
setting water prices in 
Scotland should be 
changed:  
customer financed 
capital as a notional 







It is difficult to over-estimate the importance of setting 
prices appropriately for a major utility like water, given that 
inappropriate pricing can cause unnecessary damage to 
the comparative competitiveness of a country’s economy. 
In an earlier article in the Commentary, (Cuthbert and 
Cuthbert, 2007), we gave a critique of the current cost 
regulatory capital value (CCRCV) method of utility pricing: 
a method used, for example, in setting revenue limits, and 
so prices, in the water industry in Scotland and in England. 
While that article identified significant problems with the 
CCRCV approach, we did not make detailed 
recommendations about how these problems might be 
rectified. This paper makes a specific proposal about how 
CCRCV should be modified: our proposal is particularly 
well suited to the circumstances where, as in the case of 
Scottish Water, CCRCV pricing is being applied in a 
publicly owned utility. We argue that implementation of the 
proposed approach would have a number of advantages: 
in particular, it would lead to significantly lower water 
charges, while being fully sustainable well within current 
levels of public expenditure provision; it would reduce the 
likelihood of eventual privatisation of the water industry in 
Scotland; and there is the technical advantage of greatly 
reducing the cost to the Scottish Budget of the capital 
charge levied by the Treasury on the assets of the water 
industry in Scotland.  
 
1.  Background 
1.1  Full details on the history and background of the 
CCRCV approach to utility pricing can be found in Cuthbert 
and Cuthbert, 2007. But to recapitulate briefly, the 
Regulatory Capital Value of a utility is an estimate of the 
total value of the capital value of the assets employed by 
FEBRUARY 2009 PAGE 37 
FRASER ECONOMIC COMMENTARY 
the utility in performing its functions. We draw a basic 
distinction between applications which value the assets of 
the utility at historic prices, and those which value the 
assets in some form of current prices. We denote the latter 
approach as an application of current cost regulatory 
capital value, (CCRCV).  
 
1.2   In a typical application of the CCRCV approach to 
utility price setting by a regulator, the CCRCV is rolled on 
from year to year by: 
 
a.   uprating for inflation 
b.   adding in the value of gross investment 
c.   deducting depreciation, as assessed in current cost 
terms.  
 
The regulator then sets revenue caps for the industry, (that 
is, maximum allowable revenues, which therefore 
determine maximum allowable prices), as the sum of:  
 
i.   the level of current operating expenses the regulator is 
prepared to allow, (after adjusting, for example, for 
whatever level of efficiency savings the regulator judges is 
achievable); 
 
ii.  current cost depreciation; 
 
iii. a capital charge, calculated as the product of an 
assumed rate of return times the estimated CCRCV. 
 
1.3   A version of CCRCV utility pricing was initiated in the 
mid 1990s in England and Wales by the water regulator 
OFWAT, (see OFWAT 2004), to set the revenue caps for 
the water and sewerage companies, which had been 
privatised in 1989. The approach has subsequently been 
extended in the UK to the regulation of, for example, the 
electricity distribution network, airports, and the publicly 
owned water industry in Scotland, and is also proposed for 
the water industry in Northern Ireland. 
 
1.4  There is, however, a major problem with the CCRCV 
approach. This can be seen by considering the simplest 
possible case, where the provision of capital assets is 
funded by borrowing. What the utility operator actually has 
to pay out to the market, to fully fund the provision of 
capital, is equal to depreciation and interest calculated at 
historic cost. But current cost depreciation and interest are 
normally greater than historic cost depreciation and 
interest, particularly where, as in the water industry, 
average asset lives are long: the CCRCV method thus 
leaves the operator with a financial surplus.  
 
The implications of this were examined in detail in Cuthbert 
and Cuthbert, (2007). That paper set out the underlying 
algebra, and showed that, under CCRCV pricing, the utility 
operator will typically benefit from a windfall profit on any 
capital invested: this profit is a function of the rate of 
interest, the rate of inflation, and the length of asset life.  
The profit will commonly be very significant. For example, 
for an interest rate of 5%, with inflation running at 2.5%, 
and an asset with a thirty-year life, the operator will receive 
a windfall profit of over 40% of the value of the capital 
asset. 
 
The probable consequences include: 
 
x overcharging, and excess profits 
x for a privatised utility, excess dividend payments; 
x for a non-privatised utility, funding an undue 
proportion of capital from revenue; 
x likely distortion of the capital investment 
programme, as capital investment itself becomes 
a profitable activity for the utility; 
x unnecessary uncompetitiveness of water’s 
business customers as they are over-charged for 
an important input. 
 
For a public sector utility, the likelihood is that substantial 
cash surpluses would build up in due course: this is likely 




2.   The proposed approach: treating capital 
financed from revenue as a notional loan 
2.1   Is it possible to retain the key features of the CCRCV 
approach, (for example, the way that it smoothes the 
impact on present day charges of the accident of the timing 
of past investment decisions), while at the same time 
correcting the above problems? We argue that the 
modification proposed in this section achieves precisely 
this. The proposal put forward here is particularly relevant 
to the CCRCV method as applied in a publicly owned 
utility, where the financial surplus arising from the 
application of unmodified CCRCV pricing is likely to be 
used, in the first instance, to fund net new capital formation 
out of revenue. 
 
2.2  In Cuthbert and Cuthbert 2007, we suggested that one 
route towards a more acceptable form of CCRCV would 
involve working out a proper decomposition of the current 
cost value of the capital assets of the utility into the 
components arising from different funding sources, that is, 
from borrowing, equity where appropriate, revenue raised 
from customers, inflation, etc. Once this was done, we 
argued that it should then be possible to find a more 
rational basis for determining how these different funding 
sources should be appropriately rewarded. What we are 
going to propose in this paper is in line with the spirit of this 
suggestion.  
 
2.3  What is proposed is that the basis of CCRCV should 
be retained: but that where the CCRCV surplus, (the 
difference between what is charged to customers under 
CCRCV pricing and what is needed to cover historic cost 
depreciation and interest), is used to fund the creation of 
net new capital assets, then this should be regarded as 
customer-provided capital. More specifically, it is proposed 
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that this customer-provided capital should be regarded as a 
notional loan from the consumer base to the company: a 
rebate would then be paid to the customer base, equal in 
amount to the value of historic cost depreciation and 
interest charges on the customers’ loan. 
 
(For the avoidance of doubt, we should make it clear that 
we do not propose that the calculation of notional debt 
would be carried out at the level of the individual customer. 
There would be an overall notional debt, owed to the 
customer base as a whole, on which an aggregate rebate 
would be calculated. This aggregate rebate would then 
need to be allocated to individual customers. This could be 
done in a variety of ways: e.g., as a flat percentage 
reduction in charges. This paper is not concerned with the 
precise detail of this last stage.) 
 
2.4  The following quotation, taken from a reference book 
on utility regulation issued under the auspices of the World 
Bank, is relevant to this proposal: 
 
 “The regulator may consider customer-provided 
capital to be an interest free loan to the operator, 
in which case the operator receives no return on 
that portion of its regulated assets, or the 
regulator may impute to the operator an interest 
payment on the customer provided capital, the 
effect of which is to lower the operator’s 
regulated prices.” (M.A. Jamison et al., 2004) 
 
The underline in the above quotation is ours.  It is clear that 
our proposed approach is entirely consistent with the 
principle embodied in this quotation. 
 
3.  Limiting behaviour in the steady state 
3.1  We illustrate the implications of our proposal by 
considering what happens in a steady state model, where 
real investment is running at a constant amount each year. 
This is a not unreasonable description of, for example, a 
utility like Scottish Water: witness the following quotation 
from the then Water Industry Commissioner, giving 
evidence to the Scottish Parliament Finance Committee in 
December 2003: 
 
“… Scottish Water needs to make on-going 
investment in the industry at the present levels 
for the foreseeable future. There is no prospect 
of a diminishment in the investment spend of 
£400 million to £500 million a year. Every year 
for as long as I will be on the planet, Scottish 
Water will have to spend a similar sum of 
money…” 
3.2  Specifically, we assume that gross investment is 
running at a constant real amount of 1 unit per annum. It is 
assumed that inflation is constant at r% per annum. The 
nominal interest rate is assumed to be i%, (which we 
assume is both the rate at which the utility can borrow from 
the National Loan Fund, and the rate used to assess the 
cost of capital in current cost pricing.) Each year, 
customers are charged an amount to cover the cost of the 
capital goods employed in the industry, where this amount 
is assessed using CCRCV charging. We assume that any 
surplus of customer charges over what is required to pay 
historic cost interest and depreciation is used to fund net 
new investment, and is regarded as a notional loan from 
the customer base. The customer base will in due course 
get a rebate, equal to historic cost interest and depreciation 
on this notional loan. Investment not funded from revenue 
is funded by borrowing from the NLF.  
 
3.3  In the long run, the real, (as opposed to nominal), 
unrebated current cost charge to customers implied by the 
CCRCV approach will settle down to a limiting value, which 
we denote by cc: and the real historic cost interest and 
depreciation on the total annual investment of 1 will settle 
down to a constant amount, denoted by hc. (Note that hc is 
the historic cost interest and depreciation on the gross 
investment of 1: it is not affected by whether gross 
investment is funded in whole or part by borrowing from the 
NLF or the customer). 
 
The limiting behaviour of the rebated payment system is 
entirely determined by cc and hc, as the following 
argument shows: 
 
Each year, the utility has to fund gross real investment 
of 1. The amount of free customer revenue which is 
available to fund this investment is what is left out of cc 
after paying hc historic cost interest and depreciation, 
(either to the NLF, or as a customer rebate): so the 
amount of gross investment funded from customer 
charges would be  
(cc – hc),      if cc – hc d  1:  
and 1,        if cc – hc  > 1. 
  
Hence, if M  is defined as min(cc – hc, 1), then the 
limiting proportion of gross investment funded out of 
customer charges will be M . 
 
Clearly, M  is therefore also the limiting proportion of 
outstanding debt, (actual and notional), funded from 
customer charges: so M   also represents the limiting 
proportion of historic cost charges which will go back to 
the customer as a rebate. 
 
Therefore, in the limit, the real amount which customers 
pay after rebate is  (cc - M hc). 
 
3.4  This expression, (cc - M hc), in fact tells us a great 
deal about the limiting behaviour of the rebated system. As 
we will see, the way the system behaves depends critically 
on whether real interest rates are positive or negative, 
(which corresponds to whether  hc > 1 or hc < 1): and on 
whether or not all capital expenditure is eventually funded 
direct from revenue, ( which corresponds to whether M  < 1 
or M  =1). 
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x the percentage of capital financed from customer 
revenues, if the rebate system were in operation; 
The following table shows how the amount customers pay 
after rebate, (denoted PAYS), depends on the different 
possible combinations of real interest rate and M . The 
derivation of the relationships in the table is given in Annex 
1. 
x annual borrowing from the National Loan Fund. 
 
The specific formulae used in deriving these figures are 
given in Annex 2. 
 
 Table 1:   The rebated charge:  PAYS 
 
3.7   The first point to note about Table 2 is that in all the 
cases considered, the rebated charge is a good deal less 
than the unrebated CCRCV charge: for example, in the 
case where asset life is 30 years, nominal interest rate 5%, 
and inflation 3%, the rebated charge is 62% of what the 
CCRCV charge would have been. Note too that the extent 
of the saving increases with asset life. 
 
0 <  M  < 1 M  = 1 
Real interest rate 
positive 
1 < PAYS < hc PAYS  1 t
Real interest rate 
zero 
PAYS = 1 PAYS  1 t
Real interest rate 
negative 
hc < PAYS < 1 PAYS  1 t
 
 
In most of the cases considered, the rebated charge is also 
less than the historic cost charge. The exceptions occur 
when there is a conjunction of long asset life with relatively 
high inflation: (for example, asset life 50 years, interest rate 
8%, and inflation 5%, 6% or 7%). Under these, possibly 
relatively unlikely, scenarios, the rebate model would imply 
that substantial financial surpluses would still accrue within 
the utility, (though the extent of these surpluses would be 
much less than implied by unrebated CCRCV charging.)  
3.5   This table is interesting because it gives a fairly 
complete account of the possible relationships under the 
rebate model: but of course, not all the possibilities 
considered in the table are equally likely.  If we regard as 
normality a situation where real interest rates are positive, 
(which is equivalent to the situation hc > 1), and if at the 
same time inflation is relatively low, then we would expect 
to be in the top left hand corner of the table. In this case, 
the rebated charge which customers will pay will actually 
be less than what customers would have paid if the utility 
had been operating historic cost pricing. If inflation rises, 
however, (with interest rates increasing so that real interest 
rates still remain positive), then we would find ourselves in 
the top right hand cell, with all of capital being funded from 
customer charges. In these circumstances, we could find 
ourselves back in the situation where a financial surplus is 
building up in the utility: however, the rate at which this 
surplus would accumulate would be much slower than 
under unmodified CCRCV pricing. 
 
In most of the cases considered, the rebated charge is in 
fact not much higher than 1, (which is what would be 
implied by funding all capital expenditure direct from 
revenue): typically, the rebated charge lies in the range 
1.02 to 1.23. The exceptions occur with the conjunction of 
long asset life with high inflation, in which case the rebated 
charge is a good deal higher. 
  
In most of the cases considered, the percentage of capital 
financed from revenue is substantial: (for example, for 
asset life 30 years, interest rate 5%, and inflation 3%, 54% 
of gross capital expenditure is financed from revenue).  
This percentage increases with asset life, and the rate of 
inflation. 
 
3.6   But how does this model translate into some potential 
real-life scenarios? First, we need to bring in one further 
parameter, which is the length of life of the capital assets. 
We assume that capital assets have a fixed life of n years. 
So, to summarise, we assume that we are operating a 
rebated model where we have fixed gross investment of 1 
unit in real terms per annum: that inflation is r %: the 
nominal interest rate is i %: and that capital assets last for 
n years. The following tables show the limiting real values 
which will result for a number of different combinations of n, 
i, and r. In each case, we show: 
 
The bottom row in each table gives the net amount of 
borrowing which would be required from the NLF. For 
example, for asset life 30 years, interest rate 5%, and 
inflation 3%, borrowing from the NLF each year would be 
0.158, (as compared to a gross annual investment 
programme of 1.) To put this in context: if Scottish Water’s 
investment programme is assumed to be around £600 
million per annum in real terms, then this would imply an 
annual borrowing requirement of less than £100 million: 
this compares with a current public expenditure provision of 
around £180 million per annum for Scottish Water. (In most 
of the other cases illustrated in the above table, the 
borrowing requirement would be significantly less than for 
this particular example.) 
 
x the CCRCV charge: that is, what customers would 
have been charged if full CCRCV pricing were in 
operation; 
x the Historic Cost charge:  that is, what customers 
would have been charged if historic cost pricing 
were in operation; 
 x the Rebated Charge: that is, the net amount 
customers would have been charged, after rebate, 
if the rebate system were in operation; 
3.8  As noted in the previous paragraph, the rebated 
charge in the steady state will very often be close to 1: that 
is, it will be close to what consumers would have paid if all 
capital investment had been funded direct from revenue  
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Table 2:  Limiting values for customer rebate model (gross investment = 1 unit per annum 
 
Asset life in years              30 
                                                 Interest rate  5% 
Inflation rate 2% 3% 4%
CCRCV charge 1.78 1.78 1.78
Historic cost charge 1.38 1.23 1.11
Rebated charge 1.23 1.11 1.04
% of capital financed from rev 39.5% 54.4% 66.9%
Borrowing from NLF 0.153 0.158 0.14
   
 
Asset life in years              30 
                                                 Interest rate  8% 
Inflation rate 5% 6% 7%
CCRCV charge 2.24 2.24 2.24
Historic cost charge 1.29 1.18 1.08
Rebated charge 1.02 1.06 1.16
% of capital financed from rev 94.7% 100% 100%
Borrowing from NLF 0.026 0 0
 
Asset life in years              10 
                         Interest rate  5% 
Inflation rate 2% 3% 4%
CCRCV charge 1.28 1.28 1.28
Historic cost charge 1.15 1.1 1.05
Rebated charge 1.13 1.08 1.04
% of capital financed from rev 12.2% 17.7% 22.8%
Borrowing from NLF 0.089 0.121 0.146
 
Asset life in years              10 
                        Interest rate  8% 
Inflation rate 5% 6% 7%
CCRCV charge 1.44 1.44 1.44
Historic cost charge 1.14 1.09 1.04
Rebated charge 1.1 1.06 1.03
% of capital financed from rev 30.3% 35.2% 39.7%
Borrowing from NLF 0.159 0.171 0.179
    
 
Asset life in years              50 
                         Interest rate  5% 
Inflation rate 2% 3% 5%
CCRCV charge 2.28 2.28 2.28
Historic cost charge 1.56 1.32 1.14
Rebated charge 1.16 1.02 1.13
% of capital financed from rev 71.8% 95.1% 100.0%
Borrowing from NLF 0.105 0.024 0
 
 
Asset life in years              50 
                        Interest rate  8% 
Inflation rate 5% 6% 7%
CCRCV charge 3.04 3.04 3.04
Historic cost charge 1.38 1.23 1.1
Rebated charge 1.66 1.81 1.194
% of capital financed from rev 100% 100% 100%
Borrowing from NLF 0 0 0
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each year.  This raises the question: why not move to the 
even simpler, and ultimately cheaper, system, where all 
capital expenditure is funded direct from revenue. In real 
life, however, while our assumption of constant real 
investment is likely to be reasonable as an average, the 
actual path of investment is likely to wobble around this 
average from year to year. The advantage of the rebated 
CCRCV approach is that it will smooth the impact of such 
wobbles on customer charges.  
 
4.  Dynamics of system in transitional phase 
4.1  The preceding section looked at the limiting behaviour 
of the rebated system, under the assumption of steady 
state real investment. It would, however, take n years after 
the introduction of the rebate to reach this steady state, 
where n is the asset life. It is a question of great practical 
importance, therefore, to consider how charges would 
move in the early years following the introduction of the 
rebate system. 
 
4.2  In this section we look at the dynamics of the transition 
from unmodified CCRCV pricing to rebated charging. It is 
assumed that, initially, traditional CCRCV charging is being 
operated: we assume that the system is operating in the 
limiting steady state, with unit real investment per annum: 
we assume that, initially, all gross investment is funded by 
borrowing from the NLF, with the CCRCV surplus over 
historic cost loan charges being removed from the system. 
Suppose that, at a given point in time, the rebated charging 
system is introduced. As before, we consider the three 
parameter model specified by asset life, interest rate, and 
inflation rate. 
 
4.3  Chart 1 illustrates the resulting path of rebated 
charges, in the specific case of asset life 30 years, interest 
rate 5%, and inflation 3%.The following table shows the 
rebated charge as a percentage of the CCRCV charge, for 
each of the first 15 years after the introduction of the rebate 
system, for a number of different combinations of asset life, 
interest rate and inflation:- 
 
What the Chart and Table 3 demonstrate is a pattern of a 
fairly rapid initial decline in the rebated charge, which then 
tapers off as the limiting value is approached after n years. 
Of the cases considered in the above table, the slowest 
rate of decline occurs in the left hand column, 
corresponding to asset life of 10 years, interest rate 5%, 
and inflation rate 3%. Even in this case, however, the 
rebated charges initially decline at a rate of 2% relative to 
CCRCV charges. In the other cases considered, (with 
longer asset lives which would be more typical of the water 
industry), the initial rate of decline lies between 2.5% and 
almost 5%. The implication is that substantial customer 
benefits are likely to accrue from a rebated charging 
system immediately from its date of introduction. 
 
4.4  Finally, a note of caution is appropriate. If a rebated 
charging system were being introduced in real life, then the 
starting point would not be CCRCV charging operating in a 
steady state. For example, in the water industry in 
Scotland, while future real investment appears likely to be 
fairly steady on average, (witness the quotation in 
paragraph 3.1 above), past investment experienced a 
significant real uplift to around its present level, round 
about year 2000. This implies that the starting point, if 
rebated CCRCV charging were introduced now, would be 
different from the steady state CCRCV taken as the 
starting point in the above illustrations. To understand the 
actual dynamics of rebated CCRCV charging, introduced 
from the current starting point, would therefore require 
further modelling, which lies beyond our present scope. It is 
clear, however, even without detailed modelling, that a 
rebate system would produce rapid reductions in customer 
charges, relative to the profile of unrebated CCRCV 
charges. 
 
5.  Implications for the Treasury’s capital 
charge 
5.1  In a 1995 White Paper, the then government at 
Westminster set out proposals for a new system of 
government accounting, called Resource Accounting and 
Budgeting, (RAB). RAB is a method of taking into account 
the full cost of assets consumed in the delivery of a 
government service. Essentially, in preparing their budgets, 
government departments count against their Departmental 
Expenditure Limit the cash costs of providing services, 
together with what are known as “non-cash” costs. These 
non-cash costs include an annual capital charge, related to 
the value of the capital assets controlled by the 
department. The capital charge is calculated as a rate of 
interest times the residual value, (having taken off 
depreciation), of the capital stock measured at today’s 
prices. Between 1997 and 2003 the rate of interest used by 
the government for the capital charge was 6% in real 
terms: this became 3.5% in real terms in 2003. 
 
Since Scottish Water is a public corporation, the Scottish 
government has to account each year for a capital charge 
based on the value of Scottish Water’s capital assets. 
 
5.2  The following quotation, from a Treasury document, 
describes the exact basis on which the capital charge is 
calculated: 
 
“The cost of capital charge is 3.5 per cent of the 
net assets (fixed capital and financial assets, net 
of financial liabilities and provisions) employed by 
each department.” (Treasury, 2007) 
 
This quotation clearly states that the capital charge should 
be calculated on the basis of the current cost value of the 
capital assets employed, net of any financial liabilities. The 
introduction of a rebate scheme, as proposed here, would 
mean that Scottish Water, in addition to conventional NLF 
debt, would have a notional financial liability, equivalent to 
the notional historic cost debt on which the customer base 
earns its rebate. In the spirit of the above quotation, 
therefore, the capital charge on the Scottish Government 
PAGE 42 VOLUME 32 NUMBER 3 
FRASER ECONOMIC COMMENTARY 












Table 3:  Rebated charge as % CCRCV charge, by years since introduction of rebate 
 
Asset Life 10 30 50 
 













Inflation rate 3% 5% 3% 5% 3% 5% 
 













2 98.0 96.4 97.5 95.4 97.2 96.9 
3 96.1 93.1 95.2 91.2 94.4 93.9 
4 94.3 90.1 92.9 87.2 91.8 91.2 
5 92.6 87.4 90.8 83.6 89.3 88.6 
6 91.1 85.0 88.8 80.2 87.0 86.2 
7 89.6 82.8 86.8 77.0 84.7 83.9 
8 88.3 80.8 85.0 74.1 82.5 81.8 
9 87.0 79.0 83.3 71.4 80.4 79.8 
10 85.8 77.5 81.6 68.9 78.4 78.0 
11 84.8 76.1 80.1 66.6 76.5 76.3 
12 84.8 76.1 78.6 64.4 74.7 74.6 
13 84.8 76.1 77.2 62.4 73.0 73.1 
14 84.8 76.1 75.9 60.6 71.4 71.7 
15 84.8 76.1 74.6 58.9 69.8 70.4 
Limit 84.8 76.1 62.3 45.3 44.6 54.6 
 
 
Interest Rate 5%, Inflation Rate 3%.
















Historic Cost Charges 
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____________________ for the assets of Scottish Water should be calculated on 
the basis of net assets reduced by this liability: so the 
rebated system should result in a significant reduction in 
the capital charge on the Scottish Government. 
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6.  Conclusion 
6.1  To recapitulate, the modification to CCRCV pricing 
proposed in this paper has the following advantages: 
 
It would lead to a rapid decrease in water charges, relative 
to charges under unmodified CCRCV pricing: this would be 
of direct benefit to consumers, and bestow a significant 
comparative advantage on industry in Scotland, relative to, 
for example, England, (where unmodified CCRCV remains 
in operation.) 
 
The proposed approach is fully sustainable, both in the 
sense that all sources of finance are appropriately 
rewarded, and also in the sense that the residual public 
expenditure requirement is well within the level of real 
borrowing provision for water currently in the Scottish 
budget. 
 
It should significantly reduce the burden on the Scottish 
Budget of the Treasury’s capital charge for water. 
It prevents the build-up of a financial surplus within Scottish 
Water. In addition, it will be very clear to consumers in 
general exactly what proportion of the capital stock has 
been funded directly by consumers, so increasing the 
feeling that consumers own, and benefit from, a stake in 
the industry. Both of these factors should reduce the 
likelihood of eventual privatisation. 
 
The proposal is entirely consistent with the World Bank 
principles of how customer funded capital might be 
rewarded: and it retains the smoothing benefits of the 
CCRCV approach. 
 
6.2  In the light of the above, we suggest that the proposal 







PAGE 44 VOLUME 32 NUMBER 3 
FRASER ECONOMIC COMMENTARY 
Annex 1: Derivation of relationships in Table 1 
 
Recall that PAYS =  (cc - M hc). 
First of all, suppose M  < 1: 
If hc > 1, then (cc - M hc) = (cc – hc) + (1 - M )hc > (cc – hc) + (1 - M ) = 1. 
If hc = 1, then (cc - M hc) = (cc –M ) = hc = 1. 
If  hc < 1, then (cc - M hc) = (cc – hc) + (1 - M )hc < (cc – hc) + (1 - M ) = 1. 
Moreover,  (cc - M hc) > hc  
if and only if  (cc – hc) > (cc – hc)hc 
if and only if  1 > hc,       (since (cc – hc) > 0). 
Secondly, if  M  = 1, then  
 (cc - M hc) = cc – hc   1. t
 
 
Annex 2:  Formulae used 
The specific values quoted in the paper were calculated using the following formulae. The model assumes that there is a steady 
state real level of gross investment of 1 unit per annum. There are three input parameters: interest rate, i, inflation rate, r, and 
length of asset life. The model assumes that, up to year n, pure CCRCV pricing has been in operation, with the CCRCV surplus, 
(that is, the excess of CCRCV charges over historic cost interest and depreciation), removed from the system. From year (n+1), 
the surplus is used to fund investment, and regarded as a notional loan from customers, on which they will then get a rebate, 
equal to the historic cost depreciation and interest charges on this loan. The model then models the transition to the new steady 
state. The formulae used are as follows: (note that in these formulae, r and i   are expressed as fractions). Note that the values 
calculated are in nominal terms, whereas those given in the text have been deflated to be in real terms:- 
 
Gross investment in year t =  tr)1( 
Current cost depreciation in year t =  =  tCCD
t
r)1( 
Current cost asset value in year t =  =  tCCRCV
t
rn )1)(1(5.0 
Current cost interest in year t =   tCCI
t
rni )1)(1(5.0  





















Self financed investment in year t  =    tSFI
= 0, for , nt d
= min( ( + -  - ), ),   tCCD tCCI tHCD tHCI tr)1( 
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1.  Introduction  
The purpose of this paper is to review the evolution of 
Scottish policy for the provision of ferry services 1999-
2009, a period broadly coinciding with the life of the re-
established Scottish parliament.  We shall argue that, 
despite clear and consistent warnings by this author and 
others, the government failed to put in place measures and 
safeguards that were regarded as standard practice for 
such an industry providing essential services.  These 
failures in economic regulation in the first Session of 
Parliament (1999-2003) in turn had knock-on implications 
for potential breaches of EC State aid and competition law. 
The second (2003-2007 and third (2007-continuing) 
Sessions added further new problems in terms of potential 
compliance with EC State aid and competition law. We 
suggest reasons for the emergence and persistence of 
these problems and also identify possible solutions.     
 
Most ferry operations in Scotland are provided by two 
State-owned companies, CalMac Ferries and NorthLink. 
CalMac Ferries recently won a six year contract to provide 
Clyde and Hebrides ferry services.  The contract to provide 
the Northern Isles (Orkney and Shetland to Mainland 
services) was the subject of re-tendering in 2006. In 2008, 
the Scottish Government initiated a pilot study to test a 
Road Equivalent Tariff (RET) fares system for Scotland’s 
ferry services.  Then in May 2008, the European 
Commission announced1 it was to investigate payments of 
subsidies to CalMac and Northlink  
 
As far as the current policy is concerned, the Scottish 
Parliament Information Centre (SPICe) recently produced a 
briefing paper on ferry services in Scotland and noted;   
 
The Scottish Government has never produced a separate 
ferry strategy document. However, the National Transport 
Strategy (Scottish Executive 2006) does briefly mention 
lifeline ferry services, stating: “Once the tendering of the 
Clyde and Hebrides ferry service has been completed in 
2007 we will undertake a comprehensive review of lifeline 
ferry services to develop a long-term strategy for lifeline 
services to 2025. The review will include a detailed 
appraisal of routes to determine whether a better 
configuration could be developed in response to calls for 
new and faster connections serving these isolated 
communities and a review of fares structures as part of a 
broader review of the affordability of public transport”2. 
 
That Terms of Reference of that Review have recently 
been announced and we deal with it later in this paper.   
 
We shall use the term “Executive Branch” to refer to those 
Scottish Office / Scottish Executive / Scottish Government 
officials and ministers who have held responsibilities 
individually and collectively for formulating and 
implementing ferry policy here down the years. Similarly, 
we shall use the generic term “Transport Committee” to 
refer to the Scottish Parliament’s committee with 
responsibility for ferry services, the name and remit of the 
relevant transport committee has changed over all three 
sessions of the new parliament.     
 
2.  Scottish Parliament Session 1: May 1999 - 
May 2003 
Before the new (or reconstituted) Scottish Parliament was 
a year old, the Executive Branch published “Delivering 
Lifeline Ferry Services, Meeting European Union 
Requirements: a Consultation Paper”3 in April 2000. 
Reading it now in the light of subsequent developments in 
terms of EC policy and law here (and the Executive 
Branch’s interpretation of that policy and law), it actually 
provides a clear and succinct view of the economic and 
legal issues facing policy makers in the context of what 
they could reasonably be expected to know and advise at 
the time in terms of policy options.  The consultation paper 
announced with respect to a possible legislative agenda;   
           
The existing legislation under which subsidies are 
provided to Caledonian MacBrayne … predates the 
UK's accession to the European Union and may 
require some amendment. Ministers take the view 
that any new legislation can be prepared to a 
longer timescale as domestic legislation does not 
preclude the Executive complying with the State 
aids rules. Nevertheless, Ministers believe there 
could be advantage in reviewing the legislation in 
the longer term. Whilst it would not, in any case, be 
possible to have new provisions in place for the 
first tender exercise, for subsequent exercises new 
legislation might be introduced to set the 
framework for:  
 
x the requirement to tender services in 
respect of PSOs;  
x powers to grant exclusive rights to routes in 
certain circumstances (to rule out "cherry-
picking" in the peak tourist season in a way 
which might undermine the overall viability 
of a route); and  
x setting out appropriate roles in respect of a 
possible Highlands and Islands authority, 
local authorities and others.4  
 
Before considering the fuller implications of this agenda, it 
is important to clarify the respective roles and potential 
contribution of PSOs (public service obligations) and PSCs 
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(public service contracts) under EC law in this process 
especially since contingent issues assume even greater 
significance in later years.  The relevant EC laws and 
guidelines here are contained in a variety of forms; 
regulations, cases and communications of various kinds, 
and I have collected extracts from some seminal or 
indicative documents in a single collation5, each of whose 
extracts deals with some or other aspect of PSOs in this 
context. Three points merit emphasis.   
 
First, the respective roles of PSOs and PSCs in this context 
were set out in the EC’s 1992 Maritime Cabotage 
Regulation5 which made clear that a PSC could be 
concluded “in order to provide the public with adequate 
transport services” specifying such issues as “continuity, 
regularity, capacity and quality”.   On the other hand, a 
PSO was defined as “obligations which the Community 
shipowner in question, if he were considering his own 
commercial interest, would not assume or would not 
assume to the same extent or under the same conditions”. 
PSOs were “limited to requirements concerning ports to be 
served, regularity, continuity, frequency, capacity to provide 
the service, rates to be charged and manning of the 
vessel”. The Commission recognised that it would not 
constitute State aid if the shipowner was awarded 
appropriate compensation (subsidy) for carrying out such 
PSOs, providing any compensation for PSOs “must be 
available to all Community shipowners”.  
 
In short, much like a knife and fork, both PSCs and PSOs 
are alternative tools or instruments designed for different 
economic and legal purposes. If you want to maintain an 
adequate and reliable service, you use a PSC.  If you want 
to compensate (subsidise) an operator or operators for 
carrying out socially desirable (though commercially 
unprofitable) services, you use a PSO. 
 
Second, there may be cases (in some circumstances, the 
norm) where a government would wish to ensure that 
services were both reliably provided and compensated 
appropriately with subsidy. This was acknowledged by the 
European Court in 2001 in the Analir case which 
recognised that that: “even after public service obligations 
have been imposed on the shipowners … complementary 
services could be provided by concluding a public service 
contract.7  In short, you could use these two tools 
separately and for different purposes, or you could use 
them together in complementary fashion to pursue a 
particular task – again, much as a knife and fork can be 
used independently of each other, or in complementary 
fashion to eat a meal. 
 
Third, are defined public service obligations required in 
order to subsidise EC ferry services and ensure 
compliance with the Martime Cabotage Regulation and EC 
state aid law?  This was the question asked by an MEP of 
the Commission in 2006 and the answer was unequivocal: 
“These obligations may be imposed by regulation or, if this 
does not suffice to meet essential transport needs in an 
adequate manner, laid down by way of public service 
contracts. If necessary, financial compensation may be 
granted to operators to cover the costs involved in meeting 
public service obligations. The imposition of public service 
obligations is therefore a precondition for any 
compensation being given”.8 
 
In short, while there are various methods by which PSOs 
can be imposed (including concurrently and in 
complementary fashion with PSCs as the Analir case 
above implied), the imposition of clearly defined PSOs is a 
precondition for any compensation if such subsidy is not to 
run the danger of being treated as illegal State aid.  
 
That PSOs are diferent instruments for PSCs; that you can 
use PSCs and PSOs separately or together; and that you 
must have a clearly defined PSO if you wish to subsidise 
ferry operations under Maritime Cabotage and State aid 
law; all these were (and are) well-established and accepted 
principles following from EC law.  Not only are they law, 
from an economics perspective, they are also common 
sense; a PSC can be a complex and detailed instrument 
and if you do not clearly and separately define what is the 
PSO (even if it is being delivered with the help of a PSC) 
then it can be difficult to isolate and disentangle the part of 
the contract that is being (legitimately) subsidised from that 
part which could be a purely commerial activity. None of 
this would have been regarded as a matter of controversy 
in the first Session of the Scottish Parliament, but as we 
shall see it has become very much a major issue in recent 
years.  
 
Returning to the legislative agenda sketched out above in 
“Delivering Lifeline Ferry Services”, it could be said to have 
been both appropriate and proportionate.  It included 
provision for PSOs embodied in legislation; measures to 
deal with cherry picking and the issue of exclusivity; and 
consideration of the possible roles that an “authority” could 
take here, this opening up the possibility of provision for 
oversight by an independent Regulator as was common 
practice in other industries providing essential services and 
subject to competitive tendering.9 
 
The problem was that none of this ever happened. The 
Consultation Paper said that all this should be deferred 
until after the first tender exercise, which was very much a 
matter of putting the cart before the horse. If the rules of 
the game are not drawn up until after the game is played, 
then it is not surprising if players and referees are confused 
about what does and does not constitute a legitimate 
strategy. The reason given for the deferment in the first 
place was timing.  The Executive stated they were “aiming 
to have the first tender in place by Spring 2001 with 
implementation to follow”10, in short, in about a year from 
the public announcement of the intention to consult the 
public on the matter. However, as I argued in 2001 in two 
submissions to the first Parliamentary Inquiry11, even then 
such timing was hopelessly optimistic. But this deferment 
did have the effect of helping pre-empt serious debate on 
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what the statutory and policy frameworks could and should 
look like here.    
 
It must be noted that the Executive Branch could 
reasonably claim genuine achievements in this context 
over this period. First, it argued and sustained the case for 
maintenance of the bundling of routes as represented by 
the CalMac network through to the first tendering of these 
routes (though it should be noted that the Commission has 
raised questions in its current investigation as to whether 
the Executive Branch’s actual bundling of routes here has 
led to potential State aid issues12). Second, the original 
1992 Maritime Cabotage Regulation13 made no provision 
for estuary or peninsular services to be compensated for 
(subsidised) under EC law; pressure from the Executive 
Branch and Professor Neil McCormick MEP led to the 
Commission recognising in new guidelines14 in 2003 that 
estuary/peninsular services that fulfilled certain 
geographical criteria could be treated as islands for such 
purposes. Third, it arranged for CalMac’s vessel and shore-
based infrastructure to be allocated to a VesCo or an asset 
owning company, later to be named Caledonian Maritime 
Assets Ltd (CMAL), with actual ferry operations to be 
carried out through competitive tendering of routes under 
5-year (later 6-year) contracts.  Since the relevant 
legislation made provision for possible subsidy of route 
operations through PSOs but not subsidy of investment in 
vessel construction, such separation made it easier to ring 
fence subsidy to operations only, and, as importantly, 
made it easier in principle to demonstrate to the European 
Commission that such ring fencing had taken place.       
 
However, a consequence of the absence of a clear 
statutory framework for the new regime which was to be 
put in place was that the problem was not properly defined 
and structured. It was seen narrowly as one of contract 
writing and adaptation of an existing transport service to 
comply with (what were to the Executive Branch) new EC 
rules.  The problem should have been clearly defined in the 
first instance as one of the introduction of competitive 
tendering for a de-nationalised industry providing essential 
services. Had the problem been properly defined, then 
policymakers could have drawn on the considerable body 
of knowledge and experience of how to deal with such 
problems in other formerly nationalised UK industries that 
also provided essential services.  If that had been done 
then, as I strongly argued in evidence15 in 2001 to the first 
Parliamentary Inquiry into the tendering of CalMac, policy 
makers would see from previous cases that what was 
needed was: (a) an independent regulator (b) a clearly 
defined Operator of Last Resort (OLR) and (c) a well 
developed supporting statutory framework.  
 
Had the problem been properly defined, policy makers 
would have been more likely to have anticipated and dealt 
with issues contingent on what would have to be radically 
transformed roles and functions of economic actors and 
policy makers in such circumstances. For example, when 
the need for this process became public in 2000, the 
“CalMac” Clyde and Hebridean ferry services were run by a 
nationalised industry which could buy and sell its own 
vessels and had a planning horizon that in principle could 
encompass the life of these vessels, 20 years or more. 
Today, the “CalMac” Clyde and Hebridean ferry services 
are run by an operating company that owns none of the 
vessels or linkspans it uses and whose planning horizon 
(and existence) is limited by a public sector contract which 
is constrained to 6 years under EC law. One side effect of 
the ad hoc manner in which the subsequent process was 
been handled was confusion over who is and who should 
be responsible for the long term strategy formulating role 
and functions that were previously the responsibility of 
CalMac in its capacity as a nationalised industry.  
 
But perhaps the most serious set of errors to flow from the 
misspecification of the problem was that it gave a false 
impression of what competences and capabilities were 
necessary to deal with it.  As long as this was regarded as 
just another transport problem, the Executive Branch could 
be regarded as having an abundance of inhouse resources 
that could be allocated to deal with it. But specifying the 
problem properly makes it clear that, in the UK, the 
competences and capabilities to deal with the introduction 
of competitive tendering for a de-nationalised industry 
providing essential services (such as gas, electricity, 
telecommunications, rail), lay not in Scotland but in the UK 
regulatory agencies and Whitehall. The Executive Branch, 
certainly those responsible for transport, could not in all 
fairness be regarded, then or now, as having significant 
direct experience of these matters.   
 
Part of the reasons for the misspecification of the problem 
may well have been political. There had been attempts to 
privatise CalMac during the term of the Thatcher 
government which had encountered fierce public 
opposition. Even though the Minister responsible told the 
Scottish Parliament in November 2000 that  “I am happy to 
assure members that we have no plans to privatise 
CalMac”16  the introduction of the EC competitive tendering 
dimension was seen by some as an attempt to “privatise 
CalMac by the back door”17 and led to considerable debate 
inside and outside of Parliament.      
 
It was true that CalMac was not to be privatised, though its 
status as nationalised company was to be revoked and it 
was eventually broken up into constituent State-owned 
parts. In October 2006, ownership of the CalMac’s vessel 
and harbour assets was separated out from the associated 
ferry operations and the operations were transferred to a 
new operating company within the David MacBrayne 
Group, CalMac Ferries Ltd. A separate State-owned 
company, Cowal Ferries Ltd, took over responsibility for 
CalMac’s Gourock-Dunoon operations. Caledonian 
MacBrayne Ltd. retained ownership of these vessel and 
harbour assets and was renamed Caledonian Maritime 
Assets Ltd. (CMAL). In July 2006, operation of the Northern 
Isles ferry services had been transferred to NorthLink 
Ferries Ltd. from the predecessor operator.  The David 
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MacBrayne Group became the State-owned holding 
company for the operators CalMac Ferries Ltd, Cowal 
Ferries Ltd, Northlink Ferries Ltd, and Rathlin Ferries Ld 
(the latter in Northern Ireland).18 
 
Given that the introduction of competitive tendering and de-
nationalisation for industries providing essential services in 
the UK had typically been through outright privatisation, 
any attempts to apply direct comparisons, capabilities and 
experience from these previous exercises to the CalMac 
case could have run the danger of providing ammunition to 
those who suspected and claimed that the exercise had a 
hidden agenda, irrespective of whether or not that was the 
case.    
 
Whether or not ultra-sensitivity on the part of the Executive 
Branch to charges of “back-doors privatization” contributed 
to the failure of the Executive Branch to properly specify 
the problem, the reality was that officials in the Executive 
Branch handled a major policy problem area with which 
there was no reason to believe they could have direct 
experience and familiarity, and with little evidence of 
learning lessons that could have been drawn from obvious 
and available comparators from UK regulated sectors.   
 
One area where this self-imposed myopia had an almost 
immediate effect was with respect to the apparently arcane 
(but absolutely crucial) issue of Operator of Last Resort 
(OLR). Essential services subject to competitive tendering 
in regulated sectors such as in the UK generally stipulate 
there should be a pre-designated and qualified operator 
ready to take over a tender immediately in the event of an 
incumbent’s failure (whether for technical, financial or any 
other reasons). This is not something that is really needed 
in the case of nationalised industries (as CalMac was at the 
start of this exercise). Nor is it a matter which tends to 
greatly exercise the European Commission.  This is a 
provision where principles of subsidiarity tend to come into 
play with it generally left as a matter for national 
governments or their devolved authorities to deal with. 
 
Nor is the question of OLR something that tends to be 
raised on a day to day basis for anyone looking at current 
issues affecting regulated sectors. It is rarely called on, 
which to a large extent is part of the intention behind it. An 
analogy can be drawn with the rule in tennis that a fault is 
called if a player “deliberately touches (the ball) with the 
racket more than once”.19  Once you have the rule, there is 
little chance of it being called on.  But if you do not have 
the rule then you would have a very different game indeed.   
OLR is a safety net for the case of unexpected technical or 
financial failure which may befall even a well-intentioned 
operator.  However, it is also a guard against moral hazard 
and the dangers of a tenderer using a weak or loose 
contract to misrepresent their true intentions or situation, 
and renegotiate in the course of the contract in the 
knowledge that the contract awarding authorities have little 
alternative but to accept their new terms for continued 
provision of an essential service.  
Ironically, the issue of OLR need not have become a major 
issue had the Executive Branch adopted a proposal they 
set out in their original Consultation Paper in 2000 to split 
CalMac into a small number of route bundles and tender 
the bundles separately from each other.20 Had this been 
done, the Executive Branch could have considered the 
option of inserting a clause into each tender that required 
winning tenders to act as OLR for another tender, if called 
upon to do so, with provision made for appropriate 
compensation to be made in such circumstances. There 
was no reason in principle why OLR responsibilities could 
not encompass both CalMac and Northern Isles 
operations.  Solutions of this nature had been well tried and 
tested for competitive tendering regimes in other industries 
providing essential services. But once it was decided to 
tender CalMac operations as a single bundle, this option 
was effectively precluded. With the self-imposed myopia 
that arose from failing to clearly define the problem as 
discussed above, not only was there failure to appreciate 
the opportunity for OLR solutions when they arose, it led to 
unintended consequences being overlooked when the 
parameters of the problem was changed.  
 
We emphasise that does not mean that CalMac operations 
should have been broken up (indeed as we were to argue 
later in 2005, the Altmark case suggested that there was 
perhaps no need to tender its operations in the first place). 
As was argued at the time, there are network benefits from 
maintaining its route operations in a concentrated bundle. 
But what was a serious issue then and now was how 
failure to recognize such issues and bring them directly and 
openly on to the policy agenda created potentially adverse 
consequences.        
 
The potential significance of the OLR issue is illustrated 
with the case of the Commission announcement21 in May 
2008 of their intention to investigate CalMac and Northlink 
subsidies.  The announcement notes that in the summer of 
2003, a few months after starting operations, NorthLink 
informed the Scottish Executive that it could no longer 
realistically deliver its contractual obligations over the four 
years remaining of the contract period22. The Scottish 
Executive concluded Northlink was heading for insolvency 
and unless additional subsidy was paid, lifeline services 
could have been interrupted23  Significant additional 
subsidy of about £43mill was duly paid24 and retendering 
eventually took place. The Commission Announcement25 
here notes that “According to the UK authorities, in 
preparing its bids, NorthLink assumed that it would also 
enjoy a monopoly on the ro-ro traffic … This assumption 
proved however incorrect”.  It could be added that the UK 
authorities also assumed at the initial tender award stage 
that Northlink would not threaten to withdraw from the route 
unless they were provided with more subsidy. That 
assumption also proved incorrect. The Commission’s 
provisional conclusion which the current Inquiry is 
investigating is that as far as the emergency additional 
subsidies paid to Northlink are concerned, “the payments in 
question likely constitute State aid”26 
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Some points are worth emphasising regarding this series of 
events.   
 
First, despite the fact that there had been many tenders 
and franchises in the UK transport sector over many years, 
what happened in the Northlink case was remarkable and 
unusual and indeed forced retendering of transport 
operations27 has been a relatively rare event.  
 
Second, there should have been no basis for excusing 
Northlink’s “incorrect” assumption that it “would…enjoy a 
monopoly”.  As noted above, the Delivering Lifeline Ferry 
Services consultation paper in 2000 noted that one of the 
areas that should be looked at in future was “powers to 
grant exclusive rights to routes in certain circumstances”.  
Had that been done, and the conclusions spelled out 
(whether to award, or not award, exclusive rights), then it 
would have removed any confusion or ambiguity regarding 
monopoly rights. If exclusivity was not to be granted, then 
the tenderer would bear the commercial risks that might 
accrue from any market entry in the course of the tender. 
On the other hand, if exclusivity was to be granted, then it 
would be the responsibility of the Executive Branch to 
ensure that the legitimate interests of the tenderer did not 
suffer from illegitimate market entry. It was failure to 
properly specify property rights over market operation that 
helped contribute to the subsequent problems in contract 
execution.                
 
Third, having properly established rights, risks and 
responsibilities in this case, if the operator could be seen 
as being unable or unwilling to deliver on promised 
performance for reasons which were seen as its 
responsibility, then in the final reckoning the Executive 
Branch should have been in a position to trigger the OLR 
option and replace the tenderer (as happened in the case 
in the Connex rail franchise in the South of England in the 
same year, 2003).28   
 
Fourth, we see no reason why similar circumstances could 
not re-occur with the resulting collapse of all or part of a 
tender since there has been no meaningful substantive 
changes in these respects to the regulatory framework that 
still underlies such tenders in the Scottish context.    
 
Fifth, and crucially, even though (as we have noted) the 
question of whether or not to have a clearly defined OLR 
was not something that tended to automatically raise 
issues of EC law and attract the interest of the European 
Commission, failure to deal adequately with the OLR issue 
directly limited the options available to the Executive 
Branch when the first Northlink tender threatened default.  
In turn, regulatory failure here (and the Hobson’s Choice of 
a subsidy-fuelled bail-out by the Executive Branch) led to 
possible State aid failures under EC law. In other words, it 
was not sufficient for the Executive Branch to make every 
effort to be complying with the letter and spirit of EC law in 
this context, its failure from the beginning to deal 
adequately with the routine administrative nuts and bolts 
contingent on the introduction of competitive tendering into 
a denationalized industry providing essential services had 
knock-on implications for its potential ability to comply with 
EC law.  
 
Along with Professor Tony Prosser and Captain Sandy 
Ferguson, I had warned in evidence29 to the Scottish 
Parliament’s first Inquiry into ferries in 2001 about the 
potential regulatory failings and omissions in the context of 
the proposed tenders, particularly with respect to the 
absence of an independent Regulator and clearly defined 
OLR. In their Report30 to the Committee, the committee’s 
reporters noted my specific warning that “the (Northern 
Isles) contract is not yet operational, so the regime has yet 
to be proven effective in practice”.31  In the second Inquiry 
into Scottish ferry services in 2005, an MSP asked the 
Minister who was giving evidence to the committee: “Do 
you accept that the evidence that Neil Kay gave to the 
Transport and the Environment Committee back in 2001 
about the tendering exercise for the northern isles 
(Northlink) contract has—unfortunately—proved relevant, 
given the disastrous collapse of that tender?” The Minister 
replied that there were “lessons to learn” from that 
exercise, but did not expand on what he thought they 
were.32 
 
All this is without prejudice to the question of whether or 
not the additional payments to Northlink constituted illegal 
State aid, which is a separate matter for the Commission 
and possibly the courts to decide. Our concern here is not 
with these subsequent payments as such, but solely with 
the events which led up to them, and the point is that had 
the Executive Branch followed proper and well-established 
regulatory systems and procedures, there should have 
been no significant risk here of being hostage to the 
misfortunes that subsequently befell them (and the public 
interest) in the Northlink case. Nor is there to the best of 
our knowledge any suggestion or evidence that Northlink 
was indulging in moral hazard here, and we are not 
suggesting that was a factor. The point is that vulnerability 
to such behaviour remains a structural flaw which can 
infect all such contracts given the weakness of the current 
regulatory regime.    
 
I had noted in evidence to the Scottish Parliament in 2001, 
“If the public interest is subsequently damaged because 
issues such as regulatory control and SOLR (Operator of 
Last Resort) have been neglected, this will be the 
Executive’s responsibility, not the EU’s”.33 The Northlink 
case may be taken as an early example of the 
consequences of such neglect.  The Commission 
investigation may consider here from a legal perspective 
what the Executive Branch actually did (in terms of 
additional unplanned subsidy payments), whereas from a 
regulatory economics perspective the source of these 
problems is actually to be found earlier in what the 
Executive Branch did not do.   
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I provided a fuller analysis34 of the OLR issue as an 
appendix to my submission to the second Transport 
Committee Inquiry into ferry services in 2005 with an 
update35 in 2006.  Despite the lessons that should have 
been learned from the Northlink fiasco, the Executive 
Branch has not acknowledged, at least in public, that this 
continues to be an unresolved issue with serious public 
interest concerns  
 
As for the question of an independent Regulator, in 2003, 
the Commission advised that for ferry tenders; “In principle, 
an independent authority should be responsible for the 
whole procedure. However, the Commission recognises 
that, in some cases, it might be sufficient for only the final 
part of the procedure (evaluation of the bids and adoption 
of the final decision) to be entrusted to an independent 
body.”36  
 
Whether we describe the agency responsible as an 
independent Regulator, an independent authority, or an 
independent body, the Commission’s view on how this 
process should be governed is consistent with the 
arguments put forward by Professor Prosser and me to 
Transport Committee37 and the Executive Branch in 2001.  
In ignoring or rejecting these arguments, the Executive not 
only rejected what was recognised good practice for 
essential services subject to competitive tendering, it 
should have been clear to the Executive Branch (by 2003 
at the latest) that they were also rejecting what the 
European Commission regarded as an important minimal 
requirement for compliance with EC law here.  I once again 
made the arguments for an Independent Regulator in 2005 
to the second Transport Committee Inquiry into ferries, the 
Executive Branch once again noted my arguments, and 
once again they failed to act on them.38  In July 2006, I 
wrote39 to the Minister drawing attention inter alia to the 
Commission instructions that an “independent 
authority/body” should be appointed to deal with the ferry 
tendering process but did not receive a satisfactory reply.     
 
3.  Scottish Parliament Sessions 2 and 3: 
May 2003 – Present Day  
The second Session of the Scottish Parliament May 2003 
to May 2007 was characterized by the re-formation of an 
Executive Branch coalition of Labour and Liberal 
Democrats. The most visible sign of change in terms of 
governance was that responsibility for ferry services had 
been in the hands of Labour ministers during the first 
session, and this now switched to Liberal Democratic 
responsibility for the whole of the second session. It is not 
known whether this had any direct or indirect impact on 
government policy.  The election of an SNP government in 
May 2007 created an even more visible change in 
governance, though as we shall see its approach to EC law 
largely reflected changes that had taken place in the 
second Session; however, there were some substantive 
policy changes such as the introduction of a pilot Road 
Equivalent Tariff (RET) Scheme which we discuss briefly 
below.  
However, soon after the start of the second Session, there 
was a major development in the interpretation of EC law as 
it pertained to such services. On 24 July 2003, the 
European Court of Justice in the Altmark case40 ruled that 
providing compensation is no more than is necessary to 
carry out clearly defined, transparently and objectively 
established public service obligations to enterprises 
entrusted with these obligations, such compensation did 
not constitute State aid.41  
 
Some of this built on established EU case law, but one 
aspect which did add new elements to the public debate 
was that the European Court now appeared to make 
provision for choice of operator of a PSO service not 
necessarily having to be chosen by open tender.  The 
European Court had noted that where the undertaking was 
not chosen in a public procurement procedure, the level of 
compensation should be determined by a comparison with 
an analysis of the costs that a typical transport undertaking 
would incur (taking into account the receipts and a 
reasonable profit from discharging the obligations). 
 
There has been considerable debate over the meaning, 
relevance and significance of the Altmark judgment, much 
of which goes beyond the scope of this paper.  For the 
purposes of the live debate over policy that existed at the 
time, what Altmark appeared to offer was the possibility of 
alternatives to competitive tendering, a process which had 
been criticised from a variety of perspectives ranging from 
the potential expense of such an exercise to alleged 
backdoors privatization.    
 
It was in this context that the Scottish Parliament’s 
Transport Committee set up a second inquiry into the 
proposed tendering of CalMac and invited two other 
academics (Jeannette Findlay of Glasgow University and 
Paul Bennett of Edinburgh University) and me to give 
written and oral evidence on the issues.  The then Minister 
gave assurances in evidence to Transport Committee that 
we would be consulted on these issues;   
 
If they are willing, we will make contact with 
(Findlay, Bennett and Kay) who obviously have 
worked so hard on these complicated issues over 
the past weeks and months. We will try to get 
clarification from them where that is important.42  
 
That never happened. Instead, on 12th September 2005, 
just two days before the scheduled debate in the Scottish 
Parliament on the proposed tendering of CalMac, the 
Executive Branch published a series of documents on the 
issues, including what could only be described as, in part, 
systematic attempts to discredit the evidence by Bennett, 
Findlay and me.43  There was no warning that this was to 
be done, no opportunity to discuss or rebut what were in 
many cases misleading or incomplete statements and 
criticism of these works. The debate in Parliament44 took 
place on the 14th September 2005 and the point was made 
strongly in the debate that our evidence had not been 
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treated fairly and we had not been given the (promised) 
opportunity to speak for ourselves and refute 
misunderstandings or misrepresentations.  To make 
matters worse, the debate added further serious 
misrepresentation with arguments that my proposal would 
lead to route-by-route tendering, a totally spurious 
allegation without foundation which I had refuted in direct 
evidence to the Scottish Executive own Consultation on the 
issue some months earlier.45                 
 
I have no hesitation is stating that Parliament was misled in 
that debate (which decided to agree to the Executive 
Branch’s proposal to tender CalMac). Why that should 
have taken place, and who was responsible, is best left for 
others to judge. One of the most seriously misleading 
issues was when the Executive Branch started its analysis 
of “Professor Kay's 5 part proposal which he suggests 
would meet the 4 Altmark criteria” with the bald statement 
that “the Altmark criteria are not applicable to ferry services 
which fall within the scope of the Maritime Cabotage 
Regulation”.46 
 
That was what Parliament was told in September 2005. 
Since then the European Commission has made it 
abundantly clear that not only were the Altmark criteria 
“applicable” to such ferry services, adherence to the 
Altmark criteria is essential if such services are not to run 
the danger of being vulnerable to charges of illegal State 
aid.47 But of all the statements by the Commission the most 
serious is the announcement48 in 2008 of the intention to 
investigate the possibility of illegal subsidies to CalMac and 
Northlink by the Executive Branch. Indeed, much of the 
announcement is largely reducible to two inter-related 
issues; the apparent failure of the Executive Branch to 
apply the Altmark criteria to these ferry services, and the 
linked issue of their apparent failure to apply clearly defined 
public service obligations to ferry services which were to be 
compensated with public subsidy.  As the Commission had 
clearly warned in 2006;  
 
The imposition of public service obligations is 
therefore a precondition for any compensation (for 
EC ferry services) being given …Such 
compensation does not constitute State aid if it 
complies with the criteria laid down by the Court of 
Justice in its judgment in Altmark.49     
 
In short, in rejecting the relevance of Altmark and 
attempting to discredit the academic proposals based 
around Altmark, not only was the Executive Branch case 
against alternatives to tendering CalMac based on totally 
false premises, even worse any proposals they actually 
implemented ran the danger of falling foul of EC State aid 
law. If you do not understand what the rules are, then it 
obviously increases the chances of breaching them, even if 
inadvertently and in good faith. Ignorance is no excuse 
under the law, especially when the law has been set out 
clearly and consistently, and you still choose to ignore it.     
 
These points hold forcibly in the case of the issue of the 
role of public service obligations (PSOs) in EC ferry 
services.  The new Session May 2003 – May 2007 had 
coincided with a significant switch in policy with respect to 
PSOs, though one which was not to become publicly 
apparent for several months. Right up until the dissolution 
of the Scottish Parliament at the end of the first Session in 
May 2003, the Executive Branch had made consistently 
clear the need for clearly defined and justified PSOs for 
subsidized ferry services under their jurisdiction.  The last 
reference I can trace to any stated intention by the 
Executive Branch to award PSOs for any ferry service was 
a News Release50, 20th March 2003. The following week, 
Parliament was dissolved.   
 
Such references by the Executive Branch ceased once the 
new Session of the parliament was underway, but much as 
in the Sherlock Holmes case51 of the dog that did not bark, 
the lack of references to PSOs only became apparent 
when sometime later attention was drawn to them. 
Following questions in the Scottish Parliament, the 
Executive Branch stated in 13th June 2006:  
 
The Executive is tendering on the basis of Public 
Services Contracts (PSCs). The Executive 
considers that a single PSC for the Gourock-
Dunoon ferry service and another single PSC for 
the rest of the network offer the certainty and 
security of a set service specification that will be 
welcomed by Cowal residents, residents served by 
the rest of the network and all other users of the 
ferry services. Public Service Obligations (PSOs) 
would not provide that certainty and security of 
service nor deliver on the Executive’s key policy 
objectives. Consequently there is no need to 
consider, nor do we intend to consider, issues 
arising in relation to PSOs.50 
                
Two years later (June 2008) during the third Session of the 
Scottish Parliament), the Executive Branch stated in 
evidence to the Transport Committee of the Scottish 
Parliament53;  
 
“Creating a formal public service obligation in 
relation to ferries can be done by Westminster but 
not by us.  Of course, a PSO merely protects the 
route's infrastructure; it in no way provides for there 
actually being a ferry service, because of the 
different definition of PSO in the maritime world 
compared with the aviation world …a PSC enables 
us to specify all the things that we could do with a 
PSO” 
 
It has to be said that the position of the Executive Branch in 
repudiating the use of PSOs in this context is bizarre, and 
from the point of view of what is publicly known at this 
stage, inexplicable.    
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First, the statement that the Executive Branch cannot 
award PSOs contradicts what the Executive Branch had 
stated in 2006; “The Scottish Executive also has powers to 
designate particular routes as Public Service Obligations 
(PSO)” and “the Scottish Executive retains control of the 
planning system and PSO designation which both affect 
ports, harbours and ferry routes”54.   
 
Second, on the question of a PSO supposedly protecting 
the route’s infrastructure and not services, Olivier 
Chassagne, an official with EC’s Transport Direcorate 
noted (consistent with the 1992 Martime Cabotage 
Regulation) that; “for maritime transport, PSOs can contain 
requirements only in relation to the ‘ports to be served, 
regularity, continuity, frequency, capacity to provide the 
service, rates to be charged and manning of the vessel’ (p. 
410).55  Clearly, PSOs here are about operational matters 
and services, not infrastructure. When the Executive 
Branch stated later in the same evidence, “in the maritime 
context, PSOs are about infrastructure; unlike in aviation, 
they are not about the provision of services”56, they were 
plainly wrong. 
 
Third, as for the supposed different definitions of PSO in 
maritime and aviation worlds cited by the Executive 
Branch, Chassagne notes; “In all transport modes, the 
concept of PSOs is quasi-identical”(p.408).57  
 
Fourth, on the question of a PSC supposedly enabling the 
Executive Branch to specify all the things that they could 
do with a PSO, Chassagne notes that the 2004 Combus 
judgement of the European Court of First Instance clearly 
states; “contractual obligations under a public service 
contract do not constitute PSOs”(414)58 
 
But that is just the beginning of the problems.  As we noted 
earlier, extant EC law both in principle and in actual case 
law makes it absolutely clear that if you do not have clearly 
defined and justified PSOs, then any compensation 
(subsidy) for ferry services may be judged illegal State aid.  
This is not an abstruse point, this is what concerned the 
Executive Branch in the first Session of Parliament 1999-
2003. But, most bizarrely of all, if the Executive Branch was 
in now in any doubt about the need to apply clearly defined 
and justified PSOs if you want to subsidise ferry services, 
all they had to do was to consult the Commission 
announcement59 of the decision to investigate the 
possibility of illegal State aid by the Executive Branch to 
CalMac and Northlink ferry services which had been made 
public some months ago and to which the Executive 
Branch had been invited to respond. Right at the beginning 
of this document, the fourth paragraph of the Summary 
reads:  
 
With respect to the grants awarded to CalMac, 
NorthLink 1 and NorthLink 2 the Commission 
questions whether these grants correspond to 
properly defined public service obligations within 
the meaning of EC law, and has doubts as to 
whether the related compensation is compatible 
with the common market.60 
       
The rest of the document is largely concerned with noting 
cases where the Executive Branch may have failed to 
properly define public service obligations (and adherence 
to the Altmark criteria) and possible implications under 
State aid law. 
 
How the Executive Branch could still now deny that 
properly defined public service obligations (and the Altmark 
criteria) were not only relevant but essential for ensuring 
that subsidised ferry services do not run the danger of 
falling foul of EC law here, is simply difficult to 
comprehend.  Even if, despite the Executive Branch’s 
statements in this matter, the Commission subsequently 
takes a view (contrary to that of the Executive Branch) that 
clearly defined PSOs can indeed be somehow identified 
within the PSCs in question, why take the unnecessary risk 
that the Commission will not take such a view?  I made 
these points consistently and forcibly since I first became 
aware of the problem, including in a letter to the Minister31 
in July 2006, but none of this appears to have had any 
discernable effect.       
 
In short, it appears that the Executive Branch’s evidence 
on what they understood by EC law in this context was not 
only wrong on a number of counts, it was so badly wrong 
as to represent a complete misunderstanding and 
misrepresentation of what had been known for a number of 
years to be accepted EC law here, posing real problems 
and dangers for the public interest.  
 
It should be emphasised that this is without prejudice to 
whatever the Commission might decide in their current 
investigation into alleged illegal subsidies to Scottish ferry 
services. The Commission may indeed take a sympathetic 
line to the Executive Branch’s interpretation of EC law 
here, the point is the Executive Branch’s approach to these 
problems has exposed the public interest here to 
completely unnecessary risks on these grounds, as well as 
failing to provide a coherent foundation for the formulation 
of past, present, and future policy in this context.  
 
Finally, we note in passing that in August 2007 the 
Executive Branch announced details62 of a Road 
Equivalent Tariff (RET) pilot scheme for setting ferry fares 
in Scotland. RET involves setting ferry fares on one 
measure of the comparative cost of travelling an equivalent 
distance by road. The pilot scheme started on 19 October 
2008 with RET applied to several routes in the Western 
Isles. The pilot was scheduled to run for 2½ years 
from October 19 2008 to Spring 2011.   
 
The Executive Branch argued that the high cost of ferry 
fares have been seen by many as a barrier to economic 
growth on the islands and on this point there is widespread 
agreement.  I had previously conducted a review63 in 2001 
of CalMac fares policy and concluded there was an 
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economic case for a significant fares decrease across the 
board. That still leaves the question of whether the RET 
approach can be justified on economic and social grounds, 
whether in principle and/or in practice.   
 
Reviewing RET goes beyond the scope of the present 
analysis, from the point of view of its place here it is 
sufficient to note that when the European Commission was 
asked by an MEP regarding its attitude to RET, the 
Commissioner replied that even if RET was used as a 
basis for pricing and subsidising ferry services, EU law on 
maritime cabotage and State aid would still apply.64  
 
Beyond RET, the fundamental problem here is to fathom a 
coherent way forward when the Executive Branch appears 
to know less now about the proper regulatory and legal 
basis for the formulation and implementation of ferry policy 
than was expressed in “Delivering Lifeline Ferry Services” 
in 2000.    
 
4.  Conclusions 
It is difficult to overstate both the scale of the failures in 
policy making with respect to Scottish ferries post-
devolution, nor how unnecessary such failures have been.  
The context was set in 2000 with what can be seen as little 
more than a hasty response by the newly-formed Scottish 
Executive to comply with EC law here in a matter of 
months. In principle, the old Scottish Office pre-devolution 
could be criticised for apparently having been slow to 
respond to the policy needs here, since the Maritime 
Cabotage Regulation had been put in place in 1992, while 
relevant EC State aid legislation here dated from even 
earlier periods. The time horizon set out by the Executive 
Branch for compliance (which I pointed out at the time was 
never realistic) was used as a justification for shelving any 
proposals for the kind of statutory framework and 
regulatory oversight that was by now regarded as normal 
practice for protecting the public interest in the provision of 
essential services which were to be subject to competitive 
tendering and EC law. Had the proper steps been taken, 
there would have been no need to start with a blank page. 
Lessons could have been drawn from precedents 
associated with other such industries providing essential 
services, and a coherent statutory framework and 
derivative rules and guidelines would have set out the roles 
and functions of the basic building blocks for such an 
exercise, such as an independent Regulator, Operator of 
Last Resort (OLR), and public service obligations (PSOs). 
It would also have constrained the policy making ad hocery 
which has characterised this area in subsequent years                
 
The most obvious and direct failures in the first Session of 
the Scottish Parliament 1999-2003 were in the context of 
domestic and administrative failures to provide adequate 
regulatory oversight and safeguards. However, as we have 
seen, the regulatory issues of independent Regulator and 
OLR had spillover implications for the Executive Branch in 
terms of potential issues relating to compliance with EC 
law.  The dangers here were exacerbated in the periods of 
the second and third Sessions of the Scottish Parliament 
by the Executive Branch’s rejection of PSOs and the 
Altmark criteria in this context – despite the clear and 
consistent messages from the European Commission and 
the European Court that if you want to subsidise Scottish 
ferry services you have to have both clearly defined PSOs, 
and adhere to the Altmark criteria.  
 
We now stand at a position for which I can find no 
precedent, indeed it is difficult to discern logic behind it. We 
have a situation in which commentators (author included) 
have been interpreting and advising what has been 
accepted good practice in terms of regulatory standards, 
and essential practice in terms of EC law, yet on major 
issues that advice has tended to be consistently rejected 
by the Executive Branch. Even when it has become 
absolutely clear that the European Commission supports 
these positions on issues such as an independent 
Regulator, PSOs and Altmark, the Executive Branch either 
explicitly rejects or continues to ignore such arguments. 
This is a situation where even when a position can be 
shown to be demonstrably false there appears to be no 
effective way to alter it. It is with that mindset that the 
Executive Branch’s ferry policy has steamed full speed 
ahead into the current European Commission investigation 
into alleged illegal subsidies to Scottish ferry services.  
 
The dangers are now both specific (contingent on the 
current Commission investigation) and general (with 
respect to the future of Scottish ferry policy, and the 
resulting economic and social implications). 
 
On the specific dangers contingent on the current 
Commission investigation, by default the Executive Branch 
have effectively ceded much control and discretion over 
ferry policy to third parties in Brussels.  The Commission 
has already made it clear in their announcement65 that they 
see a prima facie case that there may have been illegal 
subsidies to CalMac and/or Northlink, for reasons we have 
discussed above. One issue which the Commission has 
signalled they will be looking at is the bundling of CalMac 
routes66 raising once again the possibility that the 
Executive Branch may be forced to break up the network 
into separate smaller tenders – not for economic or social 
reasons but because the Commission wish to force through 
one version of increased transparency, an issue which the 
Executive Branch has demonstrably failed to deliver to 
date. Ironically, this tendency to break up of the network 
may be reinforced by the failure of the Executive Branch to 
put in place safeguards against cherry picking (cream 
skimming or market skimming), even though the 
Commission provided clear guidelines67 in 2003 on how 
this could be done under EC law.  These omissions had 
given the moral and legal high ground to potential cherry 
pickers who had been publicly pressing for the break up of 
the CalMac network to allow them to target high value / low 
cost market segments. Unconstrained market entry through 
cherry picking remains a potential threat to the 
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sustainability of ferry tenders in this context, whether or not 
routes are to be bundled.  
 
Another issue which is likely to arise68 in the current 
Commission investigation is the questions of subsidy to the 
Gourock-Dunoon CalMac public service when there is an 
unsubsidised private service close by. There are solutions 
to this situation consistent with EC law as I have argued69 
but since the Executive Branch has repudiated the use of 
PSOs, it is difficult to see how they can make any coherent 
representations on this matter to the Commission.  
 
But more generally, the failures by the Executive Branch 
here are likely to prejudice and distort any attempts at 
developing workable policies in this context. In August 
2008, the Executive Branch announced a Review of ferry 
policy;      
 
The review will include how lifeline ferry services 
should be procured. It will consider among other 
things; appropriate legislation and regulations, the 
use of PSOs and PSCs, how the routes should be 
bundled together, the need for a tendering system 
in future and flexibility in contracts.70  
 
But how could such a Review set out to credibly discuss 
role of PSOs when, as we have seen, the Executive 
Branch in evidence to Transport Committee only two 
months earlier had once again completely dismissed any 
notion that they would use PSOs in this context – together 
with the totally misleading inference that anything a PSO 
could do, a public service contract (PSC) could do as well? 
As for discussion of “how the routes should be bundled 
together, the need for a tendering system in future and 
flexibility in contracts” there is absolutely no point in 
discussing strategies and tactics when, as we have noted, 
you clearly do not understand the rules of the game.  The 
potential scale of public and private involvement in this 
Review is substantial, but given the premises on which it is 
built, it also promises to be a considerable waste of these 
resources and a focus for false expectations   
 
One point that should be noted in passing is that it has 
been argued that a reason why the Executive Branch has 
resisted PSOs (in regional air services as well as ferry 
services) is possibly lack of co-operation and support (or 
even active resistance) from Whitehall. While the Executive 
Branch has devolved authority here, the UK is still the 
recognised national authority from the perspective of 
Brussels.  If Whitehall was concerned that awarding PSOs 
for Scottish regional air and ferry services could trigger a 
wave of “me-too” lobbying for PSO-supported subsidies 
from other regional transport services south of the border, 
then they might be reluctant to support such mechanisms.  
 
There is not enough information in the public domain at this 
point to judge and evaluate the role of UK authorities, if 
any, in this context. What can be said is that even if the 
attitude of the UK authorities could be construed as actively 
unhelpful, this does not explain the extent and persistence 
of the failures on the part of the Executive Branch that we 
have documented here.             
 
If there is a common theme running through the problems 
we have discussed here, it is that we have seen that, if 
faced with a choice between recognising and accepting 
incontrovertible facts and evidence versus sticking to 
discredited past decisions and policies, the Executive 
Branch’s default option is for the latter. If the responsible 
departments we were dealing with were private or 
commercial organisations, such failings would usually not 
be tolerated for long and would normally be fairly easily 
exposed and dealt with. However, government 
departments raise more complex issues of adaptability, 
responsibility and accountability.  
 
Before any solutions can be developed here it must be 
clearly understood where the problems lie. It is ultimately a 
question of competences and capabilities, or, more 
precisely, the lack of them. The first step is to define the 
problem as not just another transport issue but as one of 
one of regulatory issues for an industry providing essential 
services under EC law.  Once that is done, then it opens up 
real possibilities for drawing on lessons, precedents, 
guidelines and statutory frameworks developed for other 
essential services.    
 
One part of a coherent path forward would be the 
appointment of a Task Force composed of qualified experts 
in the regulation of industries providing essential services, 
and in EC Competition and State aid law, to advise how 
policy options should be framed and pursued here. I 
argued for this in 2005 and it was supported in Parliament 
by the main opposition party the SNP71, but it has not been 
pursued since it formed the new government in May 2007. 
 
The second part of a coherent path forward would be, 
having now defined the problem properly, to appoint and 
give responsibility here to full time administrators and 
officials here with backgrounds, experience and 
qualifications in the administration and regulation of 
industries providing essential services under EC law.  This 
is not to denigrate the competences and capabilities of the 
officials who have been responsible for developing and 
administrating Scottish ferry policy to date. However, the 
fact of the matter is that they could not be expected to 
possess the necessary experience and skills required here 
since virtually all previous work relevant to the introduction 
of competitive tendering and de-nationalisation for 
industries providing essential services had taken place at 
UK and not Scottish level. Unlike most of the other formerly 
nationalised UK industries, State owned ferry services 
were essentially a Scottish phenomenon; indeed their 
relative unimportance at UK level and political sensitivities 
at Scottish level were almost certainly contributory reasons 
as to why it had been left effectively untouched by the 
wave of de-nationalisations and privatisations of the 
Eighties and Nineties started by the Thatcher government.  
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But what it also meant was that the repositories of 
expertise that existed on how to deal with these problems 
were mostly to be found south of the border.           
 
There should have been, and should be, no shame in 
looking beyond the Scottish border for the appropriate 
competences and capabilities; indeed anyone who 
recognises the merits of cross border trade knows it can 
take place in intellectual and administrative human capital 
as well as other goods and services.  Historically, there 
have been many areas of Scottish competences and 
capabilities where the cross border trade in human capital 
has emphasised exporting, so importing necessary 
competence and capabilities here should not have been 
controversial or problematic. Had the problem been defined 
properly to begin with, this part of the solution would 
automatically have suggested itself. However, given the 
default tendency of the administrative apparatus for old 
solutions and procedures despite being discredited, even 
sensible and logical suggestions are inclined to look 
hopelessly unrealistic and unattainable in such contexts.  
While that might not seem an optimistic conclusion, it might 
be regarded as not unreasonable given that this 
unresolved and muddled policy debate has already run 
almost the full course of the reconstituted Scottish 
Parliament’s first decade.  The answers you get depend on 
how you frame the questions, and until the Executive 
Branch properly frames policy questions here along the 
lines advocated in this paper, there are major obstacles in 
the way of obtaining a coherent policy framework that 
pursues social and economic objectives while still being 
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